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ALISON PECK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 1991 the European Commission adopted a decision to
grant funds to Spain to build two power plants in the Canary
Islands.1 By the end of that year, however, some residents, workers,
and environmental groups on Gran Canaria and Tenerife voiced
concern that the funding had been forwarded and construction
begun before the required environmental impact statements had
been issued. 2 Two years later, a coalition of individuals and environmental interest groups filed suit in the Court of First Instance
for the European Communities (CFI) seeking annulment of the
Commission's funding decision. 3 The CFI held that the litigants
failed to show that they were "individually concerned" by the decision and, therefore, that they lacked standing.4 On appeal, the
Court of Justice for the European Communities ("the Court of Justice" or "the Court") upheld the denial of standing, but instead
5
rested its holding on the litigants' lack of "direct concern."

*
Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP; B.A. Butler University, 1992; J.D. Yale
Law School, 1995. In fond memory of Judge G. Federico Mancini, Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 1982-99. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's
and do not purport to represent the opinion of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP.
1. Commission Decision 91/440 (C), Mar. 7, 1991 (unpublished decision, on file
with The George Washington InternationalLaw Review). The, Commission adopted the decision
pursuant to its authority to finance public development projects through the European
Regional Development Fund. Council Regulation 1787/84, arts. 17-23, 1984 O.J. (L 169) 1,
amended by Council Regulation 3641/85, 1985 O.J. (L 350) 40.
2. Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace Int'l) v. Commission (Greenpeace I1), 1998 E.C.R. 1-1651, 1705, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 60-61 (1998).
3. Id. at 1-1656.
4. Case T-585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace Int'l) v. Commission
(Greenpeace 1), 1995 E.C.R. 11-2209, 2229-2230 (Ct. First Instance 1995).
5. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1708, 1715-16.
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Article 230 (formerly Article 173)6 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community7 permits certain parties, under specific circumstances, to apply for annulment of Community measures. 8 Paragraph 4, Article 173 of the Treaty limits standing for natural and
legal persons only to those who can show that a regulation or decision is of "direct and individual concern" 9 to them, causing Community courts to strictly interpret parties' standing rights. 10 The
EC Treaty itself, and most of the case law interpreting Article
173(4), developed in the context of economic controversies, which
are the source and still the core of EC jurisdiction.1 1 In this eco6.

The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the previous Article 173 as Article 230.

CompareTRATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 o.J. (C340)
173, art. 230 (Treaty of Amsterdam), [hereinafter EC TREATY] with TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, supra, art. 173. The Treaty of Amsterdam made

no substantive amendments to the provision. All of the case law and commentary referenced in this article were written before the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam and
thus refer to the standing provision as Article 173. For the sake of clarity, this article will
refer to the current numeration schema as well as the former, which corresponds to the
pre-ratification case law and commentary.
7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), arts. 173-174.
8. The Treaty on the European Union changed the "European Economic Community" to the "European Community" and created the "European Union" by retaining the
acquis communautaire,or Community legal system, including the original treaties, secondary
legislation, and case law, and adding the second and third pillars (concerning domestic
and home policy and foreign and security policy) as supplements. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4-0005 (Neville March Hunnings ed., 1999). The retained constitutional
structure can still be referred to as "Community law." Id. In fact, "'EU law' is at present,
with very few and limited exceptions, incorrect and a solecism." Id. at 1-0053.
9. "Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against a decision
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation
or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former." EC TREATY art. 173.
10. See generally Anthony Armull, ChallengingCommunity Acts - An Introduction [hereinafter Arnull, Introduction], PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION BEFORE EUROPEAN COURTS 39, 43-46
(Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich eds., 1996) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST] (explaining
that the Court of Justice was initially restrictive in construing standing requirements for
private applicants); Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under
Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7, 46 (1995) [hereinafter Arnull,
PrivateApplicants]. For an early and insightful analysis of the Court ofJustice'sjurisprudential treatment of Article 173(4), see Eric Stein & G. Joseph Vining, Citizen Access toJudicial
Review of Administrative Action in a Transnationaland Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 219
(1976). For a response to Stein and Vining, see Hjalte Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted againstPrivatePlaintiffs?, 5 EUR. L. REv. 112 (1980). In contrast, Article 173(2) grants
broader standing rights to "privileged applicants": The European Council, the European
Commission, and Member States of the European Communities, and to "semi-privileged
applicants": The European Parliament and the European Investment Bank. EC TREATY art.
173(2); see STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw 227 (2d ed. 1995).
11. See Norbert Reich, Public Interest Litigation Before European Jurisdictions, in PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 10, at 3, 5-7; see also Heike Gading, Litigation by Public-Interest Groups in
European Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 361, 372 (1996).
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nomic context, the Court of Justice, and later the CFI, used the
"individual concern" requirement to distinguish applicants who
had suffered particularizedharm due to a Community measure from
12
those who complained only of generalized or market-wide harm.
Cases like Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Commission,13 however,
challenge these standing doctrines as applied at the frontier of
Community jurisdiction. The 1992 Maastricht revisions 14 added
environmental policy to the Treaty by imposing affirmative obligations on Community institutions.' 5 Although Community law
accordingly creates some environmental rights on the part of Community citizens, 16 those rights are by their very nature, collective.
Where environmental harm cannot be particularized to any one
person, non-privileged applicants seeking to vindicate such collective rights may never clear the hurdle of "individual concern."
Thus, the requirement of individual concern presumably precludes
not only suits by environmental litigants, but also suits brought by
12. See, e.g., Case 97/85, Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v. Commission,
1987 E.C.R. 2265, 2268-69, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,481, at 18,487 (1987) (holding that margarine producers, aggrieved by surplus butter
distribution, lacked individual concern because the decision affected them "only because
of the effects it produces on their position on the market"); Case 1/64, Glucoseries
Rbunies v. Commission, 1964 E.C.R. 413, 417, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 596, 603 (1964) (explaining that "[in view of the general economic scope of the contested Decision, it is not of
individual concern to the applicant even if the latter does occupy the position which it
claims on the . . . market."). The Court of Justice sometimes makes this distinction by
applying analysis to determine whether a measure is a true regulation (of a legislative
nature and affecting parties in a general manner) or a decision disguised as a regulation
(and therefore of particular effect on one or a few parties). See, e.g., Case 26/86, Deutz and
Geldermann, Sektkellerei Breisach/Baden GmbH v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 941, [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 668 (1987); Joined Cases 789-90/79, Calpak S.p.A. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
1949, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 26 (1986). Scholars have argued that the true regulation test and
the individual concern test are alternative rather than cumulative. See Nanette A.E.M. Neuwahl, Article 173 Paragraph4 EC: Past, Present and Possible Future, 21 EUR. L. REv. 17, 19-23
(1996).
13.

Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1651.

14. TirATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, Aug. 31, 1992, 1992 oJ. (C 244) 1, [1992]
C.M.L.R. 719 (1992) [hereinafter TEU] (amending TREATv ES ABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-II) [hereinafter EEC TREATY] as amended by SINGLE EUROPEAN Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169)

1, [1987] 2 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 741 [hereinafter SEA], art. G (adding arts. 130r-t concerning the environment)).
15. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1670-72.
16. The precise source and scope of these individual rights remains very much a matter of debate. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. It also bears noting that the
principle of Community citizenship itself was not expressly guaranteed until 1992, see TEU
art. G (adding Articles 8 through 8e on citizenship), although a defacto Community citizenship may have predated Maastricht. See SfoiRA O'LEARv, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP 17-31 (1996).
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those seeking to vindicate any sort of collective or diffuse rights. 17
In short, the fate of public interest litigation in the European Communities turns upon the meaning of individual concern.18
By basing its judgment on direct rather than individual concern,
the Court ofJustice left the door open to future claims for admissibility of cases like Greenpeace I£ However, the Court's surprising and strained - direct concern rationale suggests deep misgivings
therein as to the individual concern question.1 9 The Court's reservations may spring from two sources: First, affording standing to
collective rights applicants may be viewed by some judges as an
ultra vires expansion of the judicial function, upsetting the balance
of powers established by the Treaty and defined, in part, by Article
173(4). 20 In the parlance of U.S. law concerning standing, this is
17. Public law litigation emerged in the United States principally in the 1970s as a
means of using the courts to decide questions affecting third-party interests or the wider
public interest. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1282-94 (1976); R. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1680 (1975). Public law litigation in the EU cannot be perfectly analogized to its conceptual counterpart in the United States because of basic structural differences such as the lack of an extensive administrative authority and, more fundamentally,
any clear sense of a "European" society in whose interest to litigate. Hans-W. Micklitz, The
Interest in Public Interest Litigation, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 10, at 21, 26-29; Reich,
supra note 11, at 6-7. Nevertheless, European commentators have begun to call for a European conception of public interest litigation that would allow for the vindication of collective rights, such as consumer protection, occupational safety, or non-discrimination. See
Gading, supra note 11, at 382-87; Carol Harlow, Towards a Theory of Access for the European
Court ofJustice, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 213 (1992); Reich, supra note 10, at 6-7.
18. See Gading, supra note 11, at 370-76; Harlow, supra note 17, at 223-27; Martin Nettesheim, Article 173 of the EC Treaty and Regulations: Towards the Development of Uniform Standing Requirements, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 10, at 225, 230-31; Reich, supra note 11, at
10-16.
19. See infra notes 123-148 and accompanying text. The Court of Justice, unlike U.S.
federal courts, issues only unanimous, unsigned opinions without separate concurrences
or dissents, placing a high premium on compromise among the judges. See David Edward,
How the Court ofJustice Works, 20 EUR. L. REv. 539, 556-58 (1995).
20. See generally Christopher Harding, The Private Interest in Challenging Community
Action, 5 EUR. L. REv. 354, 361 (1980) (arguing that language of Article 173 prohibits more
expansive interpretation of individual and direct concern requirements); Harlow, supra
note 17, at 224 (Court accused of extending adjudicative role through activist procedural
rules); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 79 (4th ed. 1998)
(discussing instances where the Court ignores "distinction[s] between what law ought to be
and what it is."); Micklitz, supra note 17, at 22 (involvement of judiciary in public interest
issues raises constitutional questions in western European democratic model). But see Nettesheim, supra note 18, at 230 ("[C]onstitutional setting of the Community will not be
endangered by an extensive interpretation of Article 173 of the Treaty."); G. Vandersanden, Pour un elargissementdu droit des particuliersd'agir en annulation contre des actes autres
que les decisions qui leur sont addressees, 31 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPtEN 535, 537 (Court
placed between need for access to courts and limits of Treaty).
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the "constitutional" standing limitation. 2 1 Second, admitting cases
like Greenpeace II may be seen by the Court as opening the "floodgates" that presently keep the Court of Justice from drowning in a
sea of claims by non-privileged applicants, a significant concern to
a Court already struggling to keep up with the rising tide of its case
law. 2 2 The Court's avoidance of the individual concern issue in
GreenpeaceII may reflect these workload concerns or what U.S. federal courts call "prudential" standing limitations. 23 Part II of this
Article reviews the Greenpeace II case, focusing on the tension
between the opinion of the Advocate General on individual concern and the judgment of the Court on direct concern and positing these constitutional and prudential concerns to explain the
unsatisfying result.
Both constitutional and prudential worries arise by viewing
GreenpeaceHas a sort of Pied Piper of standing, leading forth a new,
21. SeeAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
22. The Court of Justice's (and the CFI's) reports show a Community judicature
under significant pressure. In 1998 more than half of the direct actions resolved by the
Court took 18 or more months to proceed to judgment or order, and more than 25% took
more than 27 months to complete. STATISTICAL INFORMATION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE

(1998), Figure II, (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://curia.eu.int/en/stat/index.htm>.
Appeals such as actions under Article 173 yielded percentages only slightly lower. The
cumulative effect of this pattern on the Court is apparent. In 1998 the Court completed
374 cases (420 ifjoined cases were counted individually), while 485 new cases were filed,
leaving 664 (748) cases pending at the end of the year. Id. at Table 1. Since the Council
extended the jurisdiction of the CFI in 1993 to include all actions by non-privileged applicants, Council Decision 93/350, 1993 O.J. (L 144) 21, issues of standing for natural and
legal persons now reach the Court of Justice only on appeal. Therefore, the workload of
the CFI is of even greater relevance for the question of standing under Article 173. In 1998
the CFI disposed of 279 (348) cases, while 238 new cases were filed. By the end of 1998,
569 (1007) cases were pending. STATISTICAL INFORMATION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

(1998), supra, Table I. In 1997 those numbers were 179 (186) resolved, 644 filed, and 640
(1117) pending. In 1996 172 (186) were resolved, 229 filed, and 476 (659) pending. Id. In
1998 almost 29% of cases resolved, other than staff cases, had been pending for more than
29 months. Id. at Figure II.
For commentary noting workload constraints as a factor in the Community judicature's
standing jurisprudence under Article 173, see Arnull, Introduction, supra note 10, at 40, 51,
55; Paul Craig, Legality, Standing and Substantive Review in Community Law, 14 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 507, 525 (1994); Martin Hedemann-Robinson, Article 173 EC, General Community Measures and Locus Standi for PrivatePersons: Still a Causefor Individual Concern ., 2 EUR.
PUB. L. 127, 128 (1996); Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 122-27 (Court of Justice uses Article

173(4) to craft role as European appellate court, reducing number of cases heard at first
instance); Stein & Vining, supra note 10, at 241; John A. Usher, Individual Concern in General Legislation - 10 Years On, 19 EUR. L. REv. 636, 640 (1994). One member of the Court
articulated the view that Article 173(4) has operated as the control on the "floodgates" to
the Court's jurisdiction. G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court ofJustice, 57 MOD. L. Rav. 175, 189 (1994).
23. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751-52; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-74.
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distinct category of applicants to the Community courts. Standing
in "traditional" cases is often determined by whether the applicant
is individually concerned. If the Court had held that Greenpeace II
applicants, seeking to vindicate collective environmental rights,
possessed individual concern, it would have appeared to suggest
through such a holding that individual concern no longer serves as
a barrier to collective rights cases generally. Those cases, as a
group, have been seen as threatening to result in a rush of such
cases upon the courts with no principled means of distinguishing
between them for purposes of standing.
This Article argues, however, that Greenpeace!!does not present a
new breed of individual concern cases. Rather, this categorical misconception arises from an apparent distinction between the "traditional" case, in which the courts purport only to make distinctions
in kind to separate the individually concerned applicants from
applicants lacking individual concern, and the collective rights
cases, in which courts concededly must make distinctions of degree
to draw the circle around the individually-concerned. This apparent difference disappears upon closer examination of the adjudication process inherent in any individual concern case, regardless of
whether the right at issue is particularized or collective. The idea of
individual concern in Article 173(4) is translated in doctrine into
the language of equality. Neither "individual concern" nor "equality," however, provides any operative norm by which judges may
distinguish between applicants for purposes of standing.2 4 Instead,
the norms must be extracted from the legal rules that the applicant
seeks to vindicate in a particular case - ordinarily relying on judicial discretion to glean the Community policies embodied by those
rules. Moreover, the process of identifying the relevant characteristics of the class of persons protected by those legal rules and of
identifying those characteristics in any particular applicant does
not result in a tidy assortment of applicants differing in kind.
Rather, judges must distinguish between degrees of harm to identify not only those who are concerned as matter of fact, but also
25
those who should be concerned as a matter of Community policy.
Part III examines the doctrine of individual concern as expressed
in the Treaty and in the case law of the Court of Justice, 26 drawing
24. See infra notes 208-236 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 237-257 and accompanying text.
26. Although the Court of Justice now hears actions for annulment only on appeal
from the CFI, see supra note 22, the principles and process of individual concern adjudication were established by earlier case law of the Court ofJustice interpreting Article 173(4).
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on comparisons with U.S. law to illustrate the limitations of these
doctrinal formulations of standing.
The "traditional" adjudication process, indispensably involving
judicial discretion at numerous stages, is the necessary result of a
standing analysis defined in terms of "individual concern" or
"equality." As such, every individual concern case, whether the
underlying right is particularized or collective, requires judges to
make quantitative, rather than neatly qualitative, distinctions
among applicants. Once this process is illuminated in the "traditional" individual concern case, the collective rights cases exemplified by Greenpeace !/look considerably more conventional. As in any
other individual concern case, judges must look to legal rules
underlying the claim, discover the policies embodied by those
rules, identify generally the class of persons protected, and determine which applicants best represent that class. Whether the harm
alleged is economic or environmental, judges must use their discretion to determine which applicants sufficiently demonstrate that
they are severely affected and thus deserving of protection under
Community law. Part IV, Section A, articulates a model for this process of filling the vacuum. Section B applies the model to explain
apparent discrepancies among some "traditional" standing cases,
providing at least anecdotal evidence of the operation of that
model throughout the Court of Justice's individual concern case
law.
If Greenpeace // and its progeny are no different from the "traditional" case, then both the constitutional and the prudential objections are really just sheep in wolves' clothing. Constitutionally,
hearing GreenpeaceH would not expand judicial competence into a
new arena. Applicants would be admitted or denied using the same
process, based on the same criteria of standing. That process and
those criteria would be derived from the EC Treaty requirement of
"individual concern" exactly as in "traditional" cases. Prudential
objections also are overwrought: Admitting GreenpeaceHI would not
open the floodgates to a whole new category of admissible cases,
leaving the court without any principled way to stem the tide.
Instead, collective rights cases are just like any other individual
concern cases - neither admissible nor inadmissible per se, but
rather determined by the same questions of legal interests, protected classes, and degrees of harm used in the "traditional" cases.
This Article will focus on that case law to illustrate the argument that the essence of that
adjudication differs little from what is required in collective rights cases.
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Although the necessity of conducting this analysis in collective
rights cases and the ultimate admissibility of some of those cases
will involve more work for the courts than a bright-line rule denying standing in all such cases, that workload should not overwhelm
the courts as contemplated by arguments that presume admissibility of nearly all collective rights cases. Moreover, the number of
admissible cases will depend directly upon the scope of the legal
interests created by EC law. Where the applicant before the court
best represents a class for which Community law has afforded protection, the Court of Justice's principle of effective judicial protection should offset the prudential concerns triggered by the
pressures of analyzing the standing of collective rights applicants
on the same terms as that of any other litigant.
Greenpeace II then can be evaluated for standing, removed from
the shadow of the legion of collective rights cases threatening to
overrun the courts. Although not without complications, the applicants presented persuasive arguments that secondary Community
legislation endows some natural or legal persons with a legal interest in the environment of the Canary Islands. 27 Those applicants
who live or work on Gran Canaria or Tenerife should, in this context, be within the nexus of harm required to show individual concern. 28 Most importantly, finding standing in Greenpeace II for
these reasons would neither expand the judicial role into
uncharted territory nor open the floodgates to a tidal wave of collective rights cases. In GreenpeaceH and all other individual concern
cases, each claim to vindicate collective rights would rise or fall
upon legal interests protected by the underlying rules and whether
the applicant sufficiently represents the class the Community policy seeks to protect. Part V revisits Greenpeace II to perform the
standing analysis liberated from constitutional and prudential worries. In concluding, this Article considers the implications of that
liberation for the future of public interest litigation in the European Communities.
II.

STICHTING GREENPEACE COUNCIL V. COMMISSION

A.

Background

Greenpeace II arose out of a controversy over the construction of
two power plants in the Canary Islands, on the islands of Gran
Canaria and Tenerife. Pursuant to its authority to finance public
27.
28.

See infra notes 324-340 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 341-346 and accompanying text.
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works, the Commission adopted Decision C(91) 440 of 7 March
1991 (Decision), granting the Kingdom of Spain up to European
Community Units: (ECU) 108,578,419, for construction of the two
power plants by Uni6n El6ctrica de Canarias SA (UNELCO). The
Decision provided that payments would be made in installments
29
over four years.
The Decision included provisions for the reduction or suspension of funding should the project fail to comply with the requirements of the Decision. 30 Certain standards relating to
environmental protection were among those requirements. First,
the Decision was adopted3 l pursuant to Council Regulation 2052/
88 (Environmental Regulation), stating, "[m]easures financed by
the Funds ...shall be in keeping with the provisions of the Treaties, with the instruments adopted pursuant thereto and with Community policies, including those concerning . . .environmental
protection."3 2 Second, the preamble to the Decision expressly
required compliance with Community environmental laws, Council Directive 85/337/EEC (Environmental Directive) in particular.3 3 The Environmental Directive conferred a series of rights
upon "the people who may be concerned"3 4 by projects likely to
affect the environment. The rights included access to information
about the project and entitlement "to express an opinion before
35
the project is initiated."
The project quickly aroused controversy. On December 23,
1991, two of the eventual GreenpeaceH applicants requested that the
Commission intervene to stop the construction project because
UNELCO failed to undertake the environmental assessment study
required by the Environmental Directive. 36 On November 23,
1992, another applicant reported to the Commission that
UNELCO violated Spanish law by beginning construction without
first obtaining an environmental impact statement from the local
regulatory authority.3 7 The required environmental impact statements were eventually issued on December 3, 1992.38 In March
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

GreenpeaceII, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1654.
Commission Decision 91/440 (C), supra note 1, art. 5.
Id., preamble & art. 5.
Council Regulation 2052/88, art. 7, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 9, 13.
Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40.
Id., preamble, cl.10.
Id., art. 6(2).
Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1705.
Id.
Id.
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and April of 1993, local environmental associations filed administrative appeals in Spanish courts challenging the environmental
impact statements.3 9 In December 1993 Greenpeace Spain initiated an action in the national courts challenging the validity of
40
certain administrative authorizations issued to UNELCO.
In addition to the challenges in the national arena, Greenpeace
also challenged the power plant projects on the European front. In
March 1993 Greenpeace wrote to the Commission asking whether
Community structural funds, in addition to the initial disbursement, had been paid to UNELCO. 41 In response, the Commission
referred Greenpeace to the text of the Decision. 42 In May 1993
Greenpeace sent a second letter, asking whether the disbursement
complied with the Environmental Regulation. 43 The Director-General refused to supply the requested information. 44 Representatives of the Commission and members of Greenpeace met in
Brussels on October 29, 1993, and the Commission confirmed that
a total of ECU 40 million - approximately 12 million more than the
initial disbursement - had already been paid to the Spanish government pursuant to the Decision. 45 On December 21, 1993, Greenpeace, other environmental associations, and some individuals who
lived or worked on the islands brought an action in the CFI for
annulment of the Commission decision to pay the additional
46
amounts to the Spanish government.
In the CFI, the Commission filed an objection to the admissibility of the action, arguing that the applicants lacked standing to
bring the action because they were not directly and individually
concerned by the decision as required by Article 173(4). 4 7 The
applicants claimed that all individuals, or at least those who would
suffer "'particular' detriment or loss" as a result of the Decision's
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1-1706.
41. Id.
42. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1706.
43. Id.
44. In his letter the Director General of Directorate General XVI stated, "I regret to
say that I am unable to supply this information since it concerns the internal decision
making procedures of the Commission . . . but I can assure you that the Commission's
decision was taken only after full consultation between the various services concerned."
Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1707.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Greenpeacel,.1995 E.C.R. at 11-2217-19. The Commission also argued that the applicants could not challenge the mere implementation of a Commission decision such as the
second disbursement of funds at issue in this case. Id. Because the CFI decided the case on
individual concern grounds, however, it did not reach this objection. Id. at 11-2229-30.
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effect on the environment, should have standing to challenge the
decision. 48 The formulation of individual concern in the leading
case, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission,49 required that the applicant
be distinguished "individually in the same way as the person
addressed." 50 The applicants argued that the requirement had
not, however, been uniformly enforced. 51 Finally, the applicants
asked the Court to adopt a more liberal approach to standing in
the context of environmental interests than employed for economic interests, pointing to Community policy, its international
commitments, and the laws and practices of the member states
with regard to environmental protection.5 2 The applicants
described the actual or threatened harm the Commission's decision caused them.5 3 In general, the applicants alleged detriment
54
to their health, occupation, or enjoyment of the environment.
Citing a long line of authority repeating the Plaumann formulation, the CFI first held that the applicants' standing must be evaluated using the same criteria developed in the context of economic
interests. 55 Second, the Court held that, because the applicants
"cannot be affected by the contested decision other than in the
same manner as any other local resident, fisherman, farmer or
tourist who is, or might be in the future, in the same situation,"56
they could not be individually concerned by the decision. 57 Third,
the Court held that environmental associations could not assert
standing on behalf of members who would otherwise lack it and
48. Greenpeace I, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2220.
49. Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 29 (1964).
50. Id. at 107.
51. Greenpeace I, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2220 (citing Case C-198/91, Cook v. Commission,
1993 E.C.R. 1-2487).
52. Id. at 11-2220-21.
53. Id. at 11-2221-23.
54. Id. The applicants also argued that they were directly concerned because the
Commission decision to fund the power plant construction project did not leave any discretion to the Spanish government. Id. at 11-2220 (citing Cook, 1993 E.C.R. 1-2487). They
argued that the grant of funding led directly, with no intervening factors, to the construction of the power plants that the applicants claimed would negatively affect their environmental interests. Id. at 11-2219, 2221-23 (citing Case 62/70, Bock v. Commission, 1971
E.C.R. 897, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. 160 (1971) and Case 11/82, A.E. Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 207, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 4 (1985)). The CFI did not reach the direct
concern argument. Greenpeace I, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2232.
55. Greenpeace I, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2226-27.
56. Id. at 11-2229 (citing Case 231/82, Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R.
2559 [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 40 (1984) and Case T-117/94, Associazione Agricoltori della
Provincia di Rovigo v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6669).
57. Greenpeace I, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2228-29.
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could not be individually concerned under the Court of Justice's
58
case law in their own right.
B.

An Uneasy Resolution

The Advocate General to the Court of Justice 59 perceived Greenpeace II as essentially an individual concern case. Ultimately, Advocate General Cosmas arrived at the conclusion that environmental
plaintiffs, theoretically, could be individually concerned by a Commission funding decision, though the appellants in Greenpeace II
failed to make sufficient factual allegations to show that they fell
within that class. The Advocate General conceded that his theory
of individual concern for environmental plaintiffs could not "be
directly drawn from dicta in the Court's existing case-law." 60 Nevertheless, he believed that "[t]hose dicta are . . . indicative of the
interpretative possibilities open to the Community judicature in
the context of the application of the fourth paragraph of Article
173 of the Treaty." 61
The Court, however, side-stepped this "interpretive possibility"
by ruling on grounds of direct concern. Although that ruling, specific to the GreenpeaceII situation, did not preclude a future finding
of individual concern for some collective rights applicants, it suggested some resistance to the idea of individual concern for such
applicants. The language and reasoning used in the proposal of
the Advocate General may have sounded an alarm to the Court,
triggering the judges' concerns about constitutional and prudential hazards in a finding of individual concern.
1.

Individual Concern in the Opinion of Advocate General
Cosmas

Advocate General Cosmas' opinion began by identifying the
Court of Justice case law requirement that an applicant have a
'Judicially protected right or legal interest" to challenge a Commu58. Id. at 11-2230-32. As part of this holding the Court concluded that the associations'
correspondence with the Commission regarding the second disbursement did not create a
distinct interest to give standing to the groups. Id. at 11-2232.
59. The Advocate General, while a member of the Court of Justice, acts as an advisor
to the Court rather than as a decision-maker. The Advocate General assigned to a case will
review the matter, undertake any necessary legal research, prepare an opinion, and make
"reasoned submissions" to the judges in open court. The opinion is not binding upon the
Court. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 83 (2d
ed. 1998); HARTLEY, supra note 20, at 55.
60. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1695 n.123.
61. Id.
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nity measure. 62 The Advocate General cited several judgments of
the Court 6 3 for the proposition that Article 173(4)'s requirement
of "direct and individual concern" implied, a priori, a distinct "legal
64
interest" in the applicant.
Advocate General Cosmas turned to an analysis of the legal measures at issue in Greenpeace II. First, he observed that the "Community public interest" 65 embraced a quality environment. That
endorsement could be observed in statements by the Court in its
judgments 66 and in various Treaty provisions after the Maastricht
amendments: Article 2,67 Article 3(k), 6 8 and Article 130r. 69 The
Advocate General concluded that " [t] he environment has a public
dimension which constitutes a general Community interest whose
protection is the responsibility of the member states and the Community institutions." 70 Advocate General Cosmas pointed out,
however, that the public environmental interest under Community
law only imposes obligations on the public institutions, without
71
bestowing any corresponding individual rights of enforcement.
Accordingly, the Treaty provisions grant a legal interest only to the
Member States and the Community institutions, not to individuals,
72
even in the case of a vacuum in enforcement.
62. Id. at 1-1670.
63. Id. at 1-1670 nn.35-36 (citing cases including Case 60/81, International Business
Machines, Co. v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R_ 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635 (1981), in which
the Court found that the applicant did not have a legal interest even though it satisfied the
requirements of direct and individual concern).
64. Id. at 1-1670.
65. Id. at 1-1671.
66. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1671 n.37 (citing Case C-343/95, Diego Cali & Figli
Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova S.p.A., 1997 E.C.R 1-1547, [1997] CEC (CCH)
1183 (1997) (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Cosmas of Dec. 10, 1996); Case C-195/90, Commission v. Germany, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3141, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 623 (1992); Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1988)); Case 240/83,
Procureur de la R~publique v. Association de Defense des Brfileurs d'Huiles Usagies, 1985
E.C.R. 531, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,164, at 15,985
(1985).
67. "[T]he Community shall have as its task... to promote... growth respecting the
environment." TR-ATY EsTALISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, supra note 6.
After the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 2 requires the Community to promote "a high level
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment." EC TREATY art. 2.
68. The activity of the Community is to include "a policy in the sphere of the environment." EC TREATY art. 3(1) (formerly article 3(k)).
69. The Community's environmental policy is to include "preserving, protecting and
improving the quality of the environment; protecting human health; and prudent.
utilization of natural resources." EC TirATv art. 174 (formerly Article 130r).
70. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1671.
71. Id. at 1-1672 n.41.
72. Id. at 1-1672.
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The Community environmental interest, however, also has been
incorporated into a substantial body of secondary law. Courts have
construed various directives imposing environmental obligations
on national and Community authorities as having direct effect
73
upon national law, giving enforcement rights to individuals.
From these judgments, Advocate General Cosmas observed a trend
in the law toward recognizing the direct effect of environmental
legislation, creating legal interests on the part of individuals to vindicate environmental rights.7 4 In the case of the Environmental
Directive, the Advocate General commented that the Court already
established the direct effect of Articles 2, 3, and 8. 75 Likewise, Article 6(2), upon which the appellants relied, ought to have direct
effect for the "public concerned" to challenge violations of that
article. If the appellants were among that group, he opined, they
should have a legal interest in protecting those rights in the
courts.

76

Next, Advocate General Cosmas turned to the second basis for
the appellants' claim: the Commission's obligation under the Decision and under the Environmental Regulation to monitor the environmental compliance of the financed project. 77 Although
73. Id. at 1-1673 n.48. Specifically, the Advocate General cited the Court's judgments
in Case C131-88, Commission v. Germany, 1991 E.C.R. 1-825, which found direct effect in
a directive that laid down specific and detailed provisions regarding the protection of
groundwater against contamination, Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1673, and Case C-118/
94, Associazione Italiana per il World Wildlife Fund v. Regione Vereto, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1223,
regarding the protection of wild birds, in which the Court stated "the effectiveness of such
a measure would be diminished if persons were prevented from relying on it in proceedings before the courts."
74. Greenpeace I, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1674.
75. Id. at 1-1675 n.52 (citing Case C-431/92, Commission v. Germany, 1995 E.C.R. I2189, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 196 (1995)).
76. The opinion states, "if the Commission's contested decision, under which it was
decided to continue financing the works in Spain at issue in these proceedings, infringes
those rights, then that decision did indeed 'concern' the appellants within the meaning of
the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty and the appellants were entitled, as a
matter of principle, to challenge it." Id. at 1-1675. The opinion suggests that a court would
have to find the defendant liable before it could find that the applicants in fact had a legal
interest to bring the challenge, i.e., it would have to resolve the dispute on its merits before
determining a question pertaining to standing. This statement might be better understood
to say that the appellants, as the "public concerned," should be entitled to claim an
infringement of the rights guaranteed by the directive, a claim that the courts would
resolve after the case were adjudged admissible. This reading is consistent with the Advocate General's rejection, in footnote 109, of the parties' suggestion that standing principles
should be relaxed when the Commission fails to correct a substantial irregularity because
he "would then be interpreting the procedural requirements as to admissibility after first
appraising the substance of the dispute." Id. at 1-1691 n.109.
77. Id. at 1-1676-78.

20001

Standingfor Protection of Collective Rights in the EC

Community law does not clearly give individuals the right to
enforce obligations of Community institutions, the Advocate General noted that Community law, through the doctrine of direct
effect, does grant that right with regard to the obligations of
national authorities. 78 By analogy, the Advocate General argued
that affected individuals should also be able to enforce the obligations of the Community institutions. 79 Specifically, he felt that the
Greenpeace I appellants should have a legal interest in enforcing
the Commission's monitoring obligations. 80
The Advocate General considered the "legal interest" requirement with the requirements of direct and individual concern. 81 In
that analysis, he turned immediately to the question of whether the
appellants could demonstrate individual concern and devoted the
analysis almost exclusively to that question.8 2 As a preliminary matter, he dismissed the argument that the appellants were obliged to
seek relief in the national courts. First, the appellants were not
78. Id. at 1-1677-78.
79. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1677-78.
80. Id. at 1-1678.
81. Id.
82. The Advocate General's only comments pertaining to direct concern arose in the
context of the discussion of legal interest, and were treated primarily in footnotes. In determining that an individual might have a legal interest in enforcing the monitoring obligations of the Community institutions, the Advocate General stated, "the fact that the
Commission does not itself intervene in the environment but merely finances an intervention in it does not necessarily mean that its decisions in that connection may not be likely
to affect certain individuals, and indeed in a direct and individual manner." Id. For that
proposition, he cited Case C-395/95 P, Geotronics v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2271,
[1997) 2 C.M.L.R. 820 (1997), in which the applicant company was held to be individually
concerned by a Commission decision refusing the company's tender for a project financed
by the European Development Fund. The application was admissible even though the project was exclusively under national control and the Community was merely responsible for
financing. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1678 n.61.
One other statement by the Advocate General might be perceived as relating to direct
concern. Although the direct effect of some directives would give individuals a legal interest in enforcing those obligations against the Community, he observed, that avenue would
nevertheless be "fraught with severe obstacles," principally that "the infringement of rights
enshrined in a directive as a rule stems from a decision made or action taken by a national
body which, even if it relates to an act of a Community body, cannot be the subject of
judicial review by the Community judicature." Id. at 1-1676 n.59. However, as authority for
the point the Advocate General cited Case G-97/91, Oleificio Borelli S.p.A. v. Commission,
1992 E.C.R. 1-6313, a case in which a Community act depending upon national cooperation was challenged on the basis of the illegality of the national opinion. That Advocate
General later stated that Borelli was not analogous to Greenpeace, in which the parties
claimed that the Commission act was invalid solely as a matter of Community law. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1680 n.63. He distinguished the Greenpeace situation, however,
from a hypothetical case in which the "public concerned" might try to challenge a Community financing decision based simply on the failure of the national authorities to perform
an environmental impact assessment. Id. at 1-1691 n.109.
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merely seeking to challenge the legality of a national act-the commencement of construction without proper environmental impact
assessments-but rather the legality of the Commission's own
funding decision, as a matter of Community law.8 3 Second, it is
unlikely that that question could have been raised in proceedings
before the national courts and referred to the Court of Justice. At
the time, national proceedings were already pending and a referral
to the Court of Justice had not been made. Finally, regardless of
whether a remedy existed in the national courts, the appellants
would be entitled to bring an action in the Community courts after
satisfying the requirements of Article 173.84
The Advocate General turned to the argument that the CFI had
incorrectly applied the Court of Justice's case law on individual
concern. 85 First, the Advocate General reviewed cases involving
applicants individually concerned by a Community act by virtue of
a special procedural right afforded to them in the adoption of that
act. 86 For example, a company precipitated an investigation of its
competitors by complaining to the Commission about an allegedly
anti-competitive agreement. 87 The Court held that the company
was individually concerned by the Commission's decision to
88
exempt the agreement from Community competition rules. Similarly, persons who complained of wrongful state aid provided by
Treaty procedure were found to be individually concerned by the
Commission's decisions to deny the complaints. 89 The Advocate
General observed that the Court of Justice, in one case, justified its
rulings on the grounds that parties with procedural rights "should
be able to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate
interests." 90
Second, Advocate General Cosmas noted that applicants usually
cannot establish individual concern to challenge a measure that
"applies to objectively defined situations and produces legal effects
on categories of persons determined in a general and abstract
83. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1676-77.
84. Id. at 1-1679-81.
85. In doing so, he dismissed the argument that the requirements of Article 173(4)
should not be applied to applicants bringing environmental claims. Id. at 1-1681-82.
86. Id. at 1-1682-83.
87. Case 26/76, Metro SB-Gro[lmarkte GmbH and Co. KG v. Commission, 1977
E.C.R. 1875, 1900, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 30 (1977).
88. Id. at 1-1901.
89. Case C-198/91, William Cook plc v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-2487, 1-2528; Case
169/84, Compagnie Fran~aise de I'Azote (COFAZ) SA v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 391,
416, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 385, 412 (1986).
90. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at 414, quoted in Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1683.
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manner."9' 1 Moreover, as the Court stated in Buralux SA v. Council,92 a measure may have general application even if the number
and identity of persons affected by it can, theoretically, be
93
determined.
Third, the Advocate General examined the evolution in the
Court's requirement that the applicant be a member of a "closed
class."9 4 In early cases, exemplified by Toepfer KG & Getreide-Import
Gesellschaft GmbH v. Commission, 95 and Bock v. Commission,96 the
Court found individual concern where the challenged decision
had a retroactive effect on a group whose identity was fixed and
97
known to the Commission before the contested decision was made.
In Toepfer, the Commission decision authorized protective measures that applied only to a small group of traders who had applied
for import licenses during a one-day window before discovery and
correction of a Commission error. 98 In Bock, the Commission decision authorized protective measures generally, but the national
authority informed the applicant, even before the Commission
decision, that it intended to deny the applicant's import license as
soon as the Commission gave its permission. 99
Later, the Court interpreted the "closed class" requirement
more favorably, finding that applicants were individually concerned even where the Commission did not actually know their
identities. 10 0 In A.E. Piraiki-Patraikiv. Commission,'0° the Commission was obligated to make inquiries pertaining to the economic
effects of its decision that authorized France to take protective
measures against imports of Greek cotton yarn. The Court held
that Greek cotton yarn exporters who had already executed contracts at the time of the Commission's decision were individually
concerned, even though the Commission had not undertaken an
inquiry with regard to any particular businesses. 10 2 Likewise, in
91.

Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1684.

92. Case C-209/94 P, 1996 E.C.R_ 1-615.
93. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R at 1-1684 (citing Buralux, 1996 E.C.R. 1-615).
94. Id.
95. Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, 1965 E.C.R 405, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. 111 (1965).
96. Case 62/70, Bock v. Commission, 1971 E.C.R. 897, [1972] .11 C.M.L.R. 160
(1971).
97. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R_ at 1-1684.
98. 1965 E.C.R. at 410.
99. 1971 E.C.R. at 907, 909-10.
100. Case 11/82, A.E. Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 207, 242-46, [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 4, 18 (1985).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 242-44.
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Sofrimport v. Commission,1 03 the Commission was obligated to consider the situation. of Chilean apples already in transit before passing a regulation limiting imports of those apples. Because
Sofrimport was in such a position, it was individually concerned by
the regulation in spite of the Commission's ignorance of its shipments. 10 4 The Advocate General further pointed out that, in
Sofrimport, the Court recognized that a measure might be of individual concern to a smaller closed class within a larger, unclosed
class (e.g., those importers with apple shipments in transit when
the regulation was adopted within the larger, unclosed class of all
10 5
importers of Chilean apples).
Recently, the Court departed even further from its earliest interpretations of the requirement, finding individual concern among
applicants because of the extent of the effects of the measure on
their market position. In Extramet Industrie v. Council,10 6 the Court
concluded that the applicant, the largest importer of calcium metal
in the Community, was individually concerned by a regulation limiting calcium metal imports because "its business activities depend
to a very large extent on those imports and are seriously affected by the
contested regulation."10 7 Next, in Codorniu SA v. Council,l0 8 Advocate General Lenz argued that the regulation at issue, while legislative in nature, had a particular effect and, therefore, was of
individual concern to the applicant. Although the Court's judgment was elliptical, it appeared to affirm Lenz's view that Codorniu
could be distinguished from other traders because of its particularly strong market position and the likelihood the regulation
would destroy its position.1 0 9
Advocate General Cosmas also pointed out that applicants who
exercise rights to participate in the adoption of a Community measure will be individually concerned by the measure only if it will
significantly affect them. 11 0 Nevertheless, he observed, the
"effects" rationale is not unlimited. In Buralux, the Court held that
103. Case C-152/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2477, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 597 (1988).
104. Id. at 1-2507.
105. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1686.
106. Case C-358/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619 (1991).
107. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1687-88 (quoting Extramet, 1991 E.C.R. at 2532
(emphasis in original)).
108. Case C-309/89, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561 (1994).
109. Id. at 1-1868 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Lenz of Oct. 27, 1992); see Arnull, Introduction, supra note 10, at 39, 46; Arnull, PrivateApplicants, supra note 10, at 38; Vandersanden,
supra note 20, at 544; Denis Waelbroeck & Denis Fosselard, Note, Codorniu SA v. Council of
the European Union, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 257, 262-63 (1995).
110. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1688 n.97 (citing COFA4 1986 E.C.R. at 415).
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an undertaking was not individually concerned by a regulation with
reference to shipments of waste within the Community, even
though that undertaking was the largest importer of household
waste in the France/Germany area and could not complete some
of its contracts as a result of the regulation. 1"
Advocate General Cosmas then turned to the application of
these principles of individual concern to the Greenpeace 11 case.
First, he rejected the argument that the individuals who were given
rights under the environmental Directive, which the Commission
was required to enforce, may be considered participants in the
Community decision process in the same way as applicants in the
competition and state aid cases.1 1 2 Nevertheless, the Advocate
General urged the Court to consider an extension of its rulings on
individual concern. He emphasized that despite the CFI's correct
conclusion that the Decision affected the appellants in a general
and abstract manner, that effect did not necessarily transform the
measure into a legislative characterization beyond rebuttal by nonprivileged applicants. Although the restrictions of Article 173(4)
are intended to preserve those measures that contain rules of law
from review by natural and legal persons, those limitations need
not apply "where the general and objective nature of the results
produced by the act are due not to its legislative nature but to its
11 3
subject-matter."
Instead, Advocate General Cosmas argued that the appellants
should have an opportunity to show individual concern, since the
environmental Directive and the Commission monitoring required
by the Decision gave some individuals a legal interest in its enforcement.1 1 4 The significance of equating legal interest with individual
concern was buried in a lengthy and awkward footnote. That footnote, nevertheless, contains the key that unlocks the Court's doctri111. Id. at 1-1688-89.
112. The Advocate General rejected this analogy for several reasons. First, the directive
on which the Greenpeace appellants relied lacked the binding force of the regulations at
issue in the other cases. Id. at 1-1690-91. Second, in those other cases, the applicants relied
on procedures relating exclusively to Community law, not a combination of national and
Community law. Id. at 1-1691. Even aside from those differences, the analogy failed to persuade the Advocate General because the Community decision in Greenpeace, unlike in the
cases cited, did not provide for any direct procedural involvement.by the applicants. Id.
Moreover, the "public concerned" that is granted rights under the environmental Directive
is not defined by the directive and thus could not constitute a "closed class" under the
Court's case law. Id
113. Id. at 1-1692-93.
114.

Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R at 1-1693-94.
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nal resistance to individual concern in collective rights cases. The
Advocate General stated as follows:
I believe, moreover, that judicial protection within a legal order
governed by the rule of law must seek to safeguard the rights
and interests conferred by that legal order on persons subject to
it. The procedural dimension of the legal interest, as the precondition of
admissibility of a legal action, cannot be distinguished in an absolute
mannerfrom the substantive dimension of the legal interest, which the
legal order seeks to safeguard in favour of the person entitled. Thus,

account should be taken of the particular nature of each interest protected by the Community legal order in determining the
specific procedural conditions under which the person in whose
favour the rules enshrining that interest were created may seek
judicial assistance in upholding those principles. I further
believe that to interpret the written procedural rules in such a
manner as entirely to debar a person entitled to a right or legal
interest (in the substantive sense of that term) from access to
justice to defend his interests under the legal order, first, renders nugatory recognition by substantive law of those rights and
legal interests and, secondly, must be regarded as wrong in law,
inasmuch as the procedural provisions are laid down by the
legal order in order to provide a structural framework, in so far
as practicable, to give effect to the rights or legal interests conferred on persons subject to it, and not

-

absolutely and uni-

formly - in order entirely to debar them from judicial
protection. Otherwise, if persons enjoying the protection of certain rules of law are completely debarred by procedural rules
from obtaining judicial11 5protection, the legal order is simply
abdicating its function.
By linking the question of individual concern inextricably to the
question of who has a legal interest to enforce a particular right,
the Advocate General struck at the very foundations of Community
standing doctrine: the idea that standing is a distinct body of law,
prior to and independent of the law upon which an applicant's
challenge is based. As the Advocate General "[a] dmitted [ ], on this
view of the matter, the requirement of differentiation is assimilated
to that of the existence of an individual legal interest and is perhaps
identical with it, albeit that the Community judicature has hitherto
16
not been accustomed to that assimilation."
In order to balance this recognition of a legal interest in certain
individuals with the individual concern requirement of Article
173(4), Advocate General Cosmas recommended that the Court
find a "closed class" in the persons nearest the epicenter of the
115.
116.

Id. at 1-1693 n.115 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1-1695-96 (emphasis added).
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contested environmental intervention. 117 Several principles of the
Court's case law, he believed, supported this application of the doctrine. For example, in Sofrimport, the Court found an individually
concerned "closed class" within a larger, open class.11 8 In both
Extramet and Codorniu, the Court found that the applicants were
distinguished on the basis of the extensive effect that the contested
measure had upon them as going concerns."19 In addition, several
of the cases supported the proposition that a class might be considered closed if its members had already acquired a legal right, of
20
which they were deprived by the contested measure.
Once the possibility of such a geographically based distinction is
conceded, Advocate General Cosmas argued, "[i] t is then the task
of the courts to determine, on the basis of the appropriate criteria,
the breadth of that closed class, the width of its radius."' 21 The
Advocate General recommended reliance on judicial discretion to
establish the criteria by which the class would be deemed closedin other words, how to determine those sufficiently affected to be
22
individually concerned.
2.

The Judgment of the Court of Justice

As outlined by the Advocate General, the CFI, and the appellants, the problem facing the Court of Justice was whether individual environmental interests can be vindicated in the European
Community courts or whether those interests inevitably run
aground on the individual concern requirement of Article
173(4).123 The Court ofJustice's judgment, however, deflected the
117. Id. at 1-1694.
118. Id. at 1-1695; see also id. at 1-1686 (discussing Sofrimport, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2477).
119. Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853, 1868 (1994), [1995]
2 C.M.L.R. 561, 578 (1994); Case C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, 1991 E.C.R.
1-2501, 2525 (1991), [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, 643 (1991).
120. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1696 & n.125 (citing Codorniu, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-1868;
Extramet, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2512-13; Piraiki-Patraiki,1985 E.C.R. at 243-44; Bock, 1971 E.C.R.
at 897).
121. Id. at 1-1694.
122. Finally, the Advocate General rejected the applicants' claim that the environmental associations should have the right to bring suit even if its members were not individually
concerned. Id. at 1-1698-99. Such a rule, the Advocate General stated, would permit individuals to circumvent the requirements of Article 173(4) simply by setting up environmental
associations, the number of which, moreover, would be unlimited. Id. at 1-1699. That rule
would effectively create a third class of applicants not contemplated by Article 173. Id. at I1700.
123. The arguments of the appellants before the Court of Justice attempted to frame
that general question. They argued the following: first, that the approach of the CFI left a
legal vacuum because it did not account for the diffuse nature of environmental interests;
second, that the Court should give weight to the more permissive standing doctrines of the
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question of protecting environmental rights. Instead, the judgment
used direct concern to frame the question as one regarding only
the right to proper Community financing procedures.
The Court first stated that the applicants lacked standing under
the individual concern requirement "where, as in the present case,
the specific situation of the applicant was not taken into consideration in the adoption of the act, which concerns him in a general
and abstract fashion and, in fact, like any other person in the same
situation." 124 The Court, however, then disassociated the collective rights problem from the individual concern doctrine using the
wedge of direct concern. The Court noted that the appellants were
actually aggrieved by the actions of Spain and UNELCO in building the power stations, rather than by the actions of the Commission in funding the project. 125 The Court "emphasized that it is the
decision to build the two power stations in question which is liable
to affect the environmental rights arising under Directive 85/337
that the appellants seek to invoke"1 26 and, accordingly, held that
the Decision only indirectly affected appellants' rights under the
environmental Directive. 127 This logic is tantamount to finding
that the appellants are not individually concerned because they are
not directly concerned. In spite of its recitation of individual concern, in substance, the holding denies standing because the challenged financing measure did not directly lead to the alleged
environmental harm. Characterized in this manner, the judgment
would not foreclose standing for all applicants seeking to vindicate
collective environmental interests, but only for applicants seeking
to challenge a Community financing measure when that measure
relates only indirectly to environmental threats or injuries.
In response to the appellants' argument that denial of standing
by the Court would mean that the rights guaranteed by the Environmental Directive "would have no effective judicial protection at
all,"1 28 the Court of Justice pointed out that the appellants had
Member States, as influenced by the U.S.; third, that the priority of environmental interests
in the Community legal structure requires an approach to standing that will permit individual challenges to protect those interests; and fourth, that applicants should have standing
to protect environmental interests when they can show (a) that they have personally suffered some actual or threatened detriment as a result of the challenged Community act;
(b) that the detriment can be traced to the act challenged; and (c) that the detriment is
capable of being redressed by a favorable judgment. Id. at 1-1711-14.
124. GreenpeaceII, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1715.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1-1715.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1-1716.
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already filed actions in national courts relying oft the Environmental Directive. While conceding that the "subject-matter" of the
Spanish cases differed from that in the Court of Justice, the Court
held that the appellants' environmental interests could be fully vindicated by the national courts, with referral to the Court of Justice
under Article 234 (formerly Article 177) available if appropriate. 12 9
The Court of Justice's judgment may have prudential merit in
resolving the case while deferring a contentious issue to another
day, but weighing the pros and cons of such a resolution is beyond
the scope of this Article. As a purely doctrinal matter, however, the
Court of Justice's direct concern wedge shows signs of splintering.
As the appellants argued, Spain effectively exercised no discretion
in utilizing the Community funds to build the power plants. 130 The
Decision allocated funds specifically and exclusively for the cont 31
struction of the two power plants on Gran Canaria and Tenerife.
Although the Court insisted that the construction, not the financing, aggrieved the appellants, that particular construction was the
only use to which the challenged payments could be put. If the
Commission decision had any legal effect at all, it was to cause the
construction of the power plants to which the appellants objected.
The Court's view that such a decision did not directly concern
the appellants was not a foregone conclusion based on direct concern precedent. On one hand, in some early cases the Court held
that an applicant would not be directly concerned if any intervening act, even a ministerial one, was necessary to give legal effect to
the Community action.132 On the other hand, in other cases, the
Court of Justice performed a more substantive analysis of the
causal relationship between the Community act and the alleged
129.
130.

Id.
Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1714.

131. Id. at 1-1654.
132. See Case 69/69, SA Alcan Aluminum Raeren v. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 385,
[1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 337, 345-46 (1970); Joined Cases 10 & 18/68, SocietA "Eridania"
Zuccherifici Nazionali v. Commission, 1969 E.C.R 459, 480-81, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8099, at 8410, 8425-26 (1969). In Alcan the applicants, Belgian importers and processors of unwrought aluminum, challenged a decision by
which the Commission denied an application by Belgium and Luxembourg to lower duty
rates on unwrought aluminum. Alcan, 1970 E.C.R. at 391. The Court held that the applicants could not be directly concerned because the decision merely authorized Belgium
and Luxembourg to impose a lower tariff on a quota of imports, rather than actually effecting the tariff reduction itself. Id. at 393. Thus, the decision "was of no effect other than to
create a power in favour of the Member States concerned, and does not confer any rights
on possible beneficiaries of any measures to be taken subsequently by the said States." Id.
at 393.
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injury, looking for the exercise of some discretion by the interven133
ing authority before ruling out direct concern.
Although the Court itself has not articulated doctrinal formulations to characterize these two approaches, one commentator has
divided the cases between the "formal" and "substantive" tests:
In the formal sense, a decision is of direct concern if for its final
realization it does not call for any further legal measure either
by the addressee or by any other authority. In the substantive
133. See, e.g., Case 123/77, Unione Nazionale Importatori e Commercianti Motoveicoli
Esteri (UNICME) v. Council, 1978 E.C.R. 845, 849, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8483, at 8678, 8682 (1978) (stating that a causal relation may give rise
to direct concern if the intervening step does not involve the exercise of discretion); Case
100/74, Socitt( C.A.M. SA v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1393, 1402-403, [1975 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep (CCH)
8328, at 7837, 7844 (1975) (finding individual concern present where a Commission charged with adopting detailed rules to implement a
regulation promulgated a measure differentiating applicants as a class based on a course of
action applicants pursued); Joined Cases 41-44/70, International Fruit Co. v. Commission,
1971 E.C.R. 411, 421-22, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 515, 535 (1971) (finding the parties directly
concerned and the application thus admissible where national authorities could not exercise discretion when issuing import licenses); Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, Alfred Toepfer
KG and Getreide-Import Gesellschaft GmbH v. Commission, 1965 E.C.R. 405, 410, [1966]
5 C.M.L.R. 111, 142 (1965) (finding the parties directly concerned by an immediately
enforceable commission decision retaining the measures implemented by the Federal
Republic and thus subjecting the parties to it).
For example, Toepfer arose out of a Commission error, setting zero levy rates on maize
imports from France into the Federal Republic of Germany as of October 1, 1963. Toepfer,
1965 E.C.R. at 406. A rush of applications for import licenses at the zero levy ensued,
including applications from the Toepfer applicants seeking import licenses for the month of
January at a fixed levy of zero. Id. By decision of October 3, the Commission corrected its
error; to deal with the already-pending applications, the German government denied the
applications in reliance upon a Community regulation authorizing protective measures
under certain circumstances. Id. The regulation provided that the Commission must review
any such measure and notify the member state of whether the measure would be retained,
amended, or abolished. Id. at 410. In this case, the Commission permitted the Federal
Republic to retain the measure. Id. at 406. The Court held that the applicants were directly
concerned by that decision. Id. at 410. The Court reasoned that, under the framework of
the regulation, the protective measures were not legally valid until reviewed and permitted
by the Commission; thus, the Community act was the legal cause of any harm to the applicants, even in light of the preliminary action by the German government. Toepfer, 1965
E.C.R. at 410. Conversely, in numerous cases denying direct concern the Court of Justice
has pointed to the discretion utilized by the intervening authority. See, e.g., Case 55/86,
Arposol v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 13, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 508 (1988) (finding no direct concern where regulatory penalties could only be imposed on parties pursuant to a national
decision, compliance with several conditions, and confirmation of the national decision by
the Commission); Joined Cases 89 & 91/86, L'Etoile Commerciale and Comptoir National
Technique Agricole v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 3005, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 564 (1987) (finding no direct and individual concern where a Commission decision indirectly prompted
national authorities to recover improperly granted subsidies); Case 333/85, Mannesmannr6hren-Werke AG v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1281, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 627 (1987) (finding
no direct concern where sub-quota export limit was apportioned among Community
nation's manufacturers based upon numerous criteria and a decision by that nation's
authorities).
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sense, a decision is also of direct concern if such an implementing measure is needed, but the decision-if executed in the correct way-makes it possible to foresee with certainty or a high
degree of probability that, and in what way, the implementing
34
measure will affect the interests of the applicant.
The direct concern question in Greenpeace II could have come
out differently if the Court of Justice had applied the substantive
test. This is illustrated by comparing Greenpeace IIwith Bock v. Commission,13 5 a case in which a German food importer applied to the
federal authority for a license to import Chinese mushrooms
already in circulation in the Netherlands. The German authority
applied to the Commission for permission to deny the license and
informed the applicant that it intended to deny it if permission
were granted. 136 The Commission granted permission, and the
federal authority denied the license.13 7 The Court of Justice held
that the applicant was directly concerned by the Commission decision because the German authority applied for permission with
particular reference to the applicant's pending license request
and, in communications with the applicant, already committed
itself to rejecting that application.138
The Court reviewed the Commission decision in Greenpeace II
because of the applicants' situational complaints, as in Bock. Analogously, the intervening action by the Member State was a foregone
conclusion by the time the Commission made its decision. In Greenpeace II, however, the Court held that the necessity of action-any
action-by the member state broke the causal chain between the
Commission decision and the alleged injury. 139 In Bock, the Court
held that it was possible to foresee with certainty or a high degree
of probability that the Commission decision would so affect the
applicants, and therefore the applicants were directly
40
concerned.
134. H.-W. Daig, Zum Klagerecht von Privatpersonennach Art. 173 Abs. 2 EWG-, 146 Ags. 2
EGA-Vertag, in FETSCHRIFT FUR OTro RIESE 204-05 (1964), translated and quoted in P. VAN
DIJK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF AN INTEREST TO

SUE 302-03 & n.230 (1980).
135. Bock, 1971 E.C.R. at 897.
136. Id. at 899.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 908.
139. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R at 1-1675, 1-1696-97.
140. 1971 E.C.R at 914. Similarly, the Court ofJustice has found direct concern where
a Member State requests Community assistance for a particular matter, clearly signaling
the Member State's intention to take a certain action once the Community assistance is
received. See Case 11/82, A.E. Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 207, 242, [19851

392
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The causal chain between the Greenpeace II decision and the construction of the power plants is no more remote than that between
the Bock authorization and the denial of Bock's import license.
Under the substantive approach, the Court adjudged that nexus to
bestow direct concern on an applicant harmed by the injury ultimately flowing from the Community act. 14 1 If the Court of Justice
had applied that approach in Greenpeace II, the appellants might
easily have been found to be directly concerned.
Had the Court of Justice defined the harm to appellants differently, it might also have ruled for the appellants as to direct concern. The direct concern element of Article 173(4) is essentially
the causation requirement in the EC standing doctrine.1

42

The

Court's approach to that causation question stacked the deck
against the appellants. The Court began by assuming that the harm
to the appellants could be determined empirically, without legal
judgments, and that the harm was air/noise/water pollution, or
the threat of it.143 From that point, it seems at least plausible to say
that the "cause" of the appellants' injury was Spain's action, not the
Commission's. Not surprisingly, the Court determined that Spain's
construction of the power stations, rather than the anterior step of
the Commission's funding of the power stations, was the legal
cause of the harm suffered by the appellants.

44

Harm, however, can be characterized in different ways. The
characterization of the harm goes a long way in determining which
"causes" can be linked to the particular "effect" at issue. In other
words, once the harm has been characterized, the range of possible
2 C.M.L.R. 4, 23 (1985) (holding that applicants were directly concerned because possibility of France declining to implement tariffs requested was "purely theoretical").
141. Bock, 1971 E.C.R. at 913-14.
142. "The Court's case-law establishes that a measure will be of direct concern to an
applicant . . . if it is 'the direct cause of an effect' on the applicant." Case C-358/89,
Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501, 2509, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, 637
(1991) (quoting Case 100/74, Societe C.A.M. SA v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1393, 1410,
[1975 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep (CCH)
8328, at 7849 (1975) (opinion of
Advoc. Gen. J.P. Warner of Oct. 28, 1975)). In the early days of direct concern, Advocate
General Roemer argued against this view, stating, "it cannot be the function of [the direct
concern] criterion to refer to causality" because "[a] causal relationship can equally be
direct and indirect." Toepfer, 1965 E.C.R. at 429 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Roemer ofJune
16, 1964). But causation refers precisely to the judgment of attributing legal responsibility
to events that are directly enough related to be called "causes," and to absolution of those
that are not. See Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV.
4, 19 (1982) (explaining that "any first-year law student, at least after he has read the
Palsgrafcase. .. knows that there are no 'direct' or 'indirect' injuries. There are only causal
chains of different lengths").
143. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1696.
144. Id.
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causes has been limited, perhaps to the exclusion of the defendant's action. Starting the causation analysis by defining the harm
decides the question of causal linkage between the complainant's
condition and the defendant's act before that analysis has ever
begun.
The Court's apparently empirical discernment of the harm in
GreenpeaceII obscures a choice that determines the outcome of the
direct concern question. According to the appellants, their right to
challenge the global defendant's decision derived primarily from
the direct effect of the Environmental Directive, granting "the public concerned" certain rights of notice and comment with regard to
projects that may affect the environment. 145 Specifically, member
states are required (1) to make available to the public any information collected from the developer concerning a project subject to a
requirement of environmental impact assessment; 146 (2) to allow
147
the public to express an opinion before a project is initiated;
and (3) to provide to the public information relating to any project
exempted from the requirements of the Directive. 148 Each of the
rights created, while geared to ensure the integrity of the local
environment, is procedural in nature. Thus, the Community legal
structure, as established by the Environmental Directive, attempts
to guarantee environmental integrity through a series of procedural rights directly enforceable by the individuals in the communities where development projects are proposed. Similarly, the
monitoring requirements placed on the Commission by the Greenpeace incorporation of the Community environmental laws ensured
certain procedures geared to protect the environment in locales
where projects were planned. 149 The Court might have characterized the harm to the Greenpeace II appellants as a violation of procedural guarantees for protection of the environment, rather than a
harm to the environment that the procedures ultimately sought to
protect. In other words, the Court might have viewed the harm not
as actual damage to the environment, but as damage to the opportunity to live in a clean environment. 15 0
145. Id. at 1-1659-60.
146. Council Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 32, art. 6(2).
147. Id.
148. Id. at art. 2(3)(b).
149. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1659-60.
150. For examples of the theory of loss of opportunity as cognizable injury, see Christopher T. Burt, ProceduralInjuiy Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 275 (1995); Miles A. Yanick, Loss ofProtection as Injury in Fact: An Approach to Establishing Standing to ChallengeEnvironmentalPlanningDecisions, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REo'. 857 (1996).
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Two U.S. cases, Warth v. Seldin 151 and University of California v.
Bakke, 152 illustrate this distinction. In Warth, individuals and representative organizations challenged town zoning practices, alleging
that those practices excluded people of low and moderate incomes
15 3
and, as a consequence, a disproportionate number of minorities.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had not met the burden of causation by proving that
they would have found housing in the town but for the town's zoning practices. 15 4 In Bakke, a twice-unsuccessful white applicant for
admission to the medical school at the University of CaliforniaDavis complained about the medical school's policy of setting aside
spaces for "disadvantaged"-de facto, minority-applicants in each
admitted class. 155 Bakke failed to prove that he would have been
15 6
admitted to U.C.-Davis if not for the special admissions policy.
In a footnote, the Supreme Court held that Bakke had alleged an
injury that could have been caused by the challenged act: "The
trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to be admitted,
in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all
100 places in the class, simply because of his race.... The question
of Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief."' 15 7 In Warth,
the Court defined the harm as the ability to secure housing in
Penfield. 158 The plaintiffs lacked standing because that effect
depended upon the intervening steps of the construction of low
and moderate income housing in the town and the plaintiffs'
acceptance into such housing. 159 In Bakke, on the other hand, the
Court defined the harm as deprivation of the opportunity to compete under non-racially-discriminatory rules; 160 and, naturally, the
race-based policy was the direct cause of that particular effect. Both
these judgments occurred before the causation analysis purportedly
16 1
began.
151.
152.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
438 U.S. 265 (1978). This comparison issuggested in CASS SUNSTEIN FT AL., CON-

STITUTIONAL LAW 107 (3d ed. 1996).

153. 422 U.S. at 504.
154. Id. at 501-06.
155. 438 U.S. at 265-66.
156. Id. at 266.
157. Id. at 280-81, n.14. While the Court strategically relegated this language to a footnote, itsresolution of this issue fundamentally affected the outcome of the case, as a comparison to Warth clearly indicates.
158. 422 U.S. at 504.
159. Id. at 505-07.
160. 438 U.S. at 305.
161. 422 U.S. at 504; 438 U.S. at 305.
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If the Court in Greenpeace H had identified the "effect" as the
abrogation of procedural rights rather than as a threat to the air/
water/land of Gran Canaria and Tenerife, the causal link between
62
the harm and the Community action would have been closer.'
The appellants' opportunity for the best-protected environment by
way of certain procedural guarantees was undermined when the
Commission forwarded the second disbursement without observing those procedures. 163 With the relevant "effect" thus
recharacterized, the alleged "cause" is moved a few links closer,
and its effect on the rights of the appellants might more easily be
64
viewed as direct.
For present purposes, it is not essential to determine which characterization of the harm to the GreenpeaceII appellants is the more
appropriate. The point is merely that the Court had a plausible
option, and its choice affected the outcome of the direct concern
test. Given this malleability of direct concern, the Court's reach to
decide the case on direct concern grounds bolsters the impression
that it was anxious to avoid the question of individual concern.
3.

Barring the Door Against a "New Category" of Cases?

The Court's awkward employment of the shield of direct concern suggests a deep uneasiness with the individual concern issue.
If the Court viewed Greenpeace// as a traditional case, any hesitancy
on the issue of individual concern would be unwarranted. Instead,
the Court must have perceived the collective rights issue posed by
Greenpeace II as indicia of a new breed of individual concern cases
with the potential to expand the judicial function into new terri162. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1675.
163. Id. at 1-1660-61.
164. This characterization of the harm would have been as consistent with the parties'
arguments as the characterization arrived at by the Court. The parties urged the Court to
find that an applicant claiming violations of Community environmental obligations has
standing whenever that applicant can show that "he/she has personally suffered (or is
likely to personally suffer) some actual or threatened detriment as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the Community institution concerned, such as a violation of his or her
environmental rights or interference with his or her environmental interests." Id. at 1-1663 (emphasis
added). By relying on the directly-effective provisions of the environmental Directive, violation of or interference with the appellants' environmental rights or interests might coherently refer to abrogation of the procedural guarantees of that Directive. Id. at 1-1660.
Moreover, the Court need not have assumed that the appellants would avoid that characterization because of the individual concern requirement. If lines could conceivably be
drawn to create a class individually concerned by the threat to the air/land/water of the
Canary Islands, that same line could be drawn to identify a class individually concerned by
the abrogation of procedural guarantees with regard to a development project on Gran
Canarias and Tenerife. Id. at 1-1657.
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tory, opening the door to a flood of new cases seeking to vindicate
environmental and other collective rights.
The language and reasoning used by the Advocate General may
have exacerbated the Court's perception of Greenpeace II as the
benchmark of a new category of cases. By expressly equating standing with legal interest and by emphasizing the judicial discretion
necessary to distinguish between those sufficiently affected to be
individually concerned and those outside that sphere, the Court
may have viewed the Advocate General's recommendation as a call
for an unconstitutional1 65 expansion of the judicial role of affording locus standi to a group excluded under traditional doctrine.
The prospect, moreover, of such an expansion may have daunted a
166
Court already facing serious workload concems.
Judicial discretion was inherent in the Advocate General's proposal and was reiterated throughout the opinion. For example, the
opinion stated that geographical proximity, although an important
factor in determining individual concern, must be "weighed
together with the nature of the consequences" of the environmental intervention, particularly the "extent" or "gravity" of those consequences. 16 7 The "adequacy of the definition of the closed class"
would "depend[ ] on the criteria which the Community judicature
will apply." 168 Those criteria will have to weigh heavily the "severity" of the effect on the "quality of life" of the applicant. 169 Moreover, "the criterion cannot be a mathematical one." 170 The
Advocate General characterized the individual concern test in language replete with words of relativity that require judicial balancing: "[P] rotection should be afforded to natural persons who had
previously secured, perhaps even over a longperiod of time, a quality
of life which is likely to be particularlyseverely affected by the act of
17 1
the Community institution."
165. While the treaties cannot without controversy be called a constitution in the traditional sense, many commentators view them as at least quasi-constitutional, and the EU
itself has engaged in a process of "constitution-building." See Ulrich Everling, Constitutional
Problems of the European Union - A Lawyer's View, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 286, 291 (Dieter Schmidtchen & Robert Cooter eds., 1997);John
Temple Lang, Community ConstitutionalLaw, in CONSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 124 (Brigid Laffan ed., 1996).
166. See sources cited supra note 22.
167. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1694.
168. Id. at 1-1696.
169. Id.
170. Id
171. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably, the words "previously secured" and "affected by
the act" might involve a significant degree of judicial line-drawing as well.
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Although the language of individual concern as reviewed by the
Advocate General has suggested that the Court need only make
distinctions in kind between applicants-those whose circumstances objectively place them within a "closed class" and those
whose circumstances do not-Advocate General Cosmas' Greenpeace II opinion openly advocated that the Court make distinctions
as to degree-e.g., those who are close enough, those who are
severely enough affected, and those who are not. Even though
grounded in the doctrines expressed by the Court from Toepfer and
Bock through Extramet and Codorniu, the Advocate General's recommendation sounded in a kind of judicial exercise different from
that in which the Court acknowledged itself to be engaged in
approaching the question of individual concern. Although Advocate General Cosmas ultimately concluded that the Greenpeace I
appellants failed sufficiently to show that they should come within
that closed class, a72 the effect of the rule he proposed would have
allowed a new class of applicants to bring challenges on the basis of
collective rights by making an adequate showing of nexus. The
Court may have ruled on direct concern in one last attempt to bar
the door against the pressure of this "new category" of cases.
III.

THE LIMITS OF

Locus

STANDI

Closer examination of the nature of standing determinations
reveals that the Advocate General's opinion did not propose any
significant expansion of the judicial process in such decisions and
thus would not lead to the automatic admissibility of most or all
cases in this "new category." On the contrary, the Court's standing
decisions inevitably involve the kind of analysis and line-drawing
that the Advocate General proposed; they merely cloak that process in the abstract language of individual concern.
"Individual concern" itself, even as formulated by the Court in its
case law, is incapable of supplying norms to standing doctrine.
Only at the level of individual and particular legal claims can the
Court begin to determine whether a person's particular, unique
mix of "attributes" and "circumstances" makes him akin to the
addressee, and different from most others, in the legally relevant
respect. At the necessary level of particularity, however, the language of the Treaty, even as formulated by the Court in Plaumann
172. Id. at 1-1700. The Advocate General was equivocal on this point. In a footnote he
suggested that proving the environmental impact of a project for which no environmental
impact assessment had been performed would be an inappropriate, insurmountable doctrinal hurdle for the applicants. See Greenpeace 1H, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1698 n.128.
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& Co. v. Commission,1 7 3 provides no guidance to judges faced with
the task of finding some principle to grant or deny standing. Such
principles must derive from a source independent of standing
doctrine.
The exercise of locating those principles and situating particular
applicants within or without them always involves the same type of
judicial discretion that Advocate General Cosmas more openly
advocated in Greenpeace II. Rather than automatically opening the
doors to a new class of litigants, the Advocate General's proposal
would merely have the Court apply its usual adjudication process to
determine the standing of litigants with collective rights claims.
Those claims may be admitted or denied using precisely the same
criteria that have always applied to litigants seeking to establish
individual concern. Although a few more cases will likely be admissible, the Court need not fear providing a new category of litigants
a free pass to the Community courts.
A.

Individual Concern: The Law that Wasn't

Article 173(4) states that non-privileged applicants may challenge Community decisions (or disguised decisions 174 ) that are
addressed to them or, though addressed to someone else, that are
of direct and individual concern to them. 175 In Plaumann, the
Court first attempted to formulate the individual concern requirement into a workable test of standing, applicable to all cases
presenting questions of standing for non-privileged applicants. 17 6
In that case, an importer challenged a Commission decision denying authorization to the Federal Republic of Germany to lower the
customs tariff on clementines. 177 In articulating the grounds for its
judgment, the Court made no reference to the subject matter of
173. Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 29 (1964).
174. On the "unmasking" of decisions disguised as regulations, see generally Rosa
Greaves, Locus Standi Under Article 173 EEC When Seeking Annulment of a Regulation, 11 EutR.
L. REV. 119 (1986) (examining the difference between a regulation and a decision, and a
natural or legal person's direct and individual concern, in the context of European Community anti-dumping cases); Christopher Harding, The Review of EEC Regulations and Decisions, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 311 (1982) (exploring the manner in which the Court of
Justice has distinguished between EEC regulations and decisions); Paul Nihoul, La
recevabilit4 des recours en annulation introduits par un particulier d l'encontre d'un acte communautaire deportgegt6rale, 30 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 171, 178-81, 18586 (1994) (reviewing six distinct cases wherein the "right or advantage produced by the
regulation was suppressed by the effect of a modifying action (importation suspensions)").
175. EC TiR.Aw art. 173(4).
176. 1963 E.C.R. 95.
177. Id. at 96.
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the contested decision or the Treaty provisions upon which the
178
applicant's claim was based.
Divorced from any consideration of context, the Court
announced its now often repeated formulation of the individual
concern doctrine:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may
only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects
them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them
or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated
from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them
individually just as in the case of the person
179
addressed.
Applying that principle to the case at hand, the Court stated that
Plaumann lacked standing because he was affected only "by reason
of a commercial activity which may at any time be practiced by any
80
person."1
In that judgment, the Court signaled its view that standing doctrne can be understood, characterized, and applied in the
abstract, as an inquiry prior to and conceptually distinct from the
substance of the applicant's claim. In subsequent cases, the Court
commonly followed this approach, quoting or paraphrasing the
Plaumannformulation and deciding the question of individual con81
cern before raising questions going to "substance."'
Notably, the Court carved out a few categories of cases in which
the nature of the underlying claim expressly does affect the analysis
of the applicant's standing. In these categories, the Court acknowledged the grounds of the applicant's complaint-e.g., Treaty pro178. Id. at 106-08.
179. See, e.g., Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853, 1-1872-73,
[1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561, 579 (1994) (holding that applicant had standing because its trademark created individual concern); Case 97/85, Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH
v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 2265, 2286-87, [1986-1988] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
14,481, at 18,495-96 (1987); Case 231/82, Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R.
2559, 2566, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 40 (1984); Case 88/76, Soci~tc pour l'Exportation des
Sucres v. Commission, 1977 E.C.R. 709, 725, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8418, at 7480, 7492 (1977) (holding that applicant had standing because it
was individually distinguished by the date of issuance of its exportation license); Case 100/
74, Socit6 C.A.M. v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R1 1393, 1403, [1975 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 1 8328, at 7844 (1975) (holding that applicant had standing
because of unique factual circumstances which distinguished it from all other persons);
Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, Toepfer v. Commission, 1965 E.C.R 526, 539, 19 C.M.L.R.
111, 127 (1966) (holding that applicant had standing where individual concern was evidenced by particularized financial changes).
180. 1963 E.C.R. at 107.
181. See supra note 178.
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visions and secondary legislation relating to dumping, 182
competition, l8 3 state aid, 184 and democratic process' 8 5 -and
decided the applicant's standing rights in light of the purposes of
those provisions. 186 Even in these cases, however, the Court sometimes introduced its individual concern analysis by repeating the
Plaumannlanguage, 18 7 as if the generically formulated statement of
individual concern were determinative, even in concededly claim188
specific standing decisions.
182. See, e.g., Case C-358/89, Extramet Industrie v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501, [1993]
2 C.M.L.R. 619 (1991); Case 240/84, NTN Toyo Bearing v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1809,
[1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 76 (1989); Case 264/82, Timex Corp. v. Council and Commission, 1985
E.C.R. 849, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 550 (1985).
183. See, e.g., Case 75/84, Metro v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3021, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R.
118 (1987) (stating that an undertaking which has an interest in submitting observations
under Article 85 is directly and individually concerned by the decision granting the exemption); Case 210/81, Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3045, [1984] 1
C.M.L.R 63 (1984) (stating that persons entitled to request that the Commission find an
infringement of Articles 85 and 86 may institute proceedings if compliance with their
request is not complete).
184. See, e.g., Case C-367/95 P, Commission v. Chambre Syndicale Nationale des
Entreprise de Transports de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval), 1998 E.C.R. 1-1719 (finding that
where state aid is compatible with the common market, the persons or entities who may be
affected by the grant of the aid must be permitted to bring proceedings for annulment of
the decision); Case 169/84, Compagnie Franiaise de l'Azote (COFAZ) v. Commission,
1986 E.C.R 391, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R1 385 (1986) (granting trade association entitlement to
challenge a decision by the Commission of the European Community to terminate a procedure, based in part on prior case law and the EEC treaty).
185. Only one case falls into this category. See Case 294/83, Parti tcologiste 'Les Verts'
v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R 1339, 1340, 1349-51, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343, 357
(1987) (granting the applicant standing against the European Parliament because it was
consistent with the purpose of the EEC Treaty, which was to allow a direct action against all
measures adopted by the institutions that are intended to have legal effects).
186. See WEATHERJLL & BEAuMONT, supra note 10, at 234-37, 240-44; Arnull, Private
Applicants, supra note 10, at 30-33; Craig, supra note 22, at 516-20; Jos4e Carlos Moitinho de
Almeida, Evoluci6n jurisprudencial en materia de acceso de los particulares a la jurisdicci6n
comunitaria, in EL DERECHO COMUNITAmO EUROPEO Y Su APuCACION JUDICAL (Gil Carlos

Rodriguez Iglesias & Diego J. Linan Nogueras eds., 1995).
187. See, e.g., Case C-70/97 P, Kruidvat BVBA v. Commission, 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
6429 (E.C.J. Nov. 17, 1998) (denying admissibility in competition case but employing
Plaumann standard); Extramet, 1991 E.C.R at 1-2532 (recognizing that the right of certain
categories of individuals to bring an action cannot prevent other individuals from also
claiming their own differentiated concerns); COFAZ 1986 E.C.R. at 414 (finding admissibility based on the nature of applicant's rights but noting the consistent application of
Plaumann in many of the Court's decisions).
188. In COFA7 1986 E.C.R. 391, for example, the Court's rehearsal of the parties'
arguments indicated the centrality of the applicants' underlying claim that the Commission improperly found that a tariff system for natural gas prices in the Netherlands did not
constitute state aid prohibited by Article 92
1 of the EEC Treaty. In reviewing those
arguments, the Court noted that the Commission maintained that "Articles 92 and 93 of
the Treaty did not confer a right on individuals," 1986 E.C.R. at 412, that "Articles 92, 93 and
94 do not confer a specific status on the applicants," id., and that even a showing of the appli-
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If the Plaumanntest were really determining the outcome in the
cases to which the Court purported to apply it, the Court would
grant standing in these "special category" cases no more often than
in other types of cases. Commentators have noted that the test is, at
best, "not enlightening."' 189 Nothing in the Plaumann language
alone suggests why the exporters in Allied Corp. v. Commission,190 an
antidumping case, should be "differentiated from all other persons... just as in the case of the person addressed," 19 1 but that the
192
general class of exporters in A.E. Piraiki-Patraikiv. Commission,
concerning import quotas imposed under the Act of Accession for
Greece, should not. The different standards acknowledged in these
cases attest that the Plaumanndoctrine alone is not the true basis of
the individual concern analysis.
Even among cases not falling into any of the four special categories, the Plaumann test does not provide a consistent standard for
distinguishing the individually concerned from the unconcerned.193 For example, consider the fates of the different appli19 4 The applicants were Greek
cants in Piraiki-Patraiki.
cotton yarn
producers and exporters who complained about a Commission
cants' competitive position "would not in itself demonstrate that they had an interest in challenging a decision establishing that the aid was not incompatible with the common
market." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court noted that the applicants argued
that "an undertaking which is adversely affected by an aid has a right similar to that conferred by [a regulation prescribing procedures for anti-competition investigations]." Id. at
413 (emphasis added). Despite the fact that the Court's judgment of admissibility was
expressly based on the nature of the rights granted to the applicants by the investigation
procedure of Article 93, the Court began its opinion on individual concern by repeating
the entire Plaumann formulation, and noting its application in "a consistent line of decisions of the Court." Id. at 395.
189.

Waelbroek, Les compftences de la Cour dejustice (II), 1971 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURIS-

PRUDENCE BELGE 513, 530 (1971). Other commentators call that characterization "a
resounding understatement." Stein & Vining, supra note 10, at 224; see also Nettesheim,
supra note 18, at 231 (explaining that "the Plaumann formula does not offer any criteria
that would allow subdivision of this open group of addressees."); Vandersanden, supra note
20, at 545 (explaining that a litigant who challenges act addressed to third party "really
finds himself in the situation of someone who has entered into a labyrinth, doesn't know
which path to choose, and doesn't know if the one he chooses will be the right one"
(author's translation)).
190. Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984 E.C.R. 1005, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 572 (1984). In
Allied Corp. U.S. fertilizer exporters challenged a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties
on certain chemical fertilizers originating in the United States. Id.
191. 1963 E.C.R. at 106.
192. Case 11/82, 1985 E.C.R. 207, [19851 2 C.M.L.R. 4 (1985).
193. The unpredictability of results of the Court's individual concern case law has been
commonly noted. Some commentators decry this inexactitude as evidence of need for
reform of the standard, see Nettesheim, supra note 18, at 234-40, or even revision of the
Treaty, see Neuwahl, supra note 12, at 30-31.
194. 1985 E.C.R. at 227.
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decision permitting France to place import quotas on cotton yarn
originating in Greece.1 95 Some of the applicants had already
entered into contracts for the delivery of cotton yarn in France,
effective during the time in which such imports were restricted by
the Commission decision. 19 6 The Court, after quoting Plaumann,
held that those contracts "constitute[ ] a circumstance which distinguishes [those applicants] from any other person concerned by
the decision.', 9 7 The other applicants, however, were not individually concerned. 198 In arriving at that decision, the Court of Justice
applied some species of the "closed circle" rule: An applicant is
individually concerned only if it is part of a "closed circle of persons who were known at the time of [the measure's] adoption." 19 9
According to the Piraiki-PatraikiCourt, the only such closed circle
was the class of applicants who had already entered into binding
contracts at the time the decision was taken. 200
Although not without some intuitive appeal, this distinction cannot be said to arise from the Plaumanndoctrine. That doctrine simply requires that the applicant be "distinguished from all others...
just as in the case of the person addressed." 20 1 The applicants in
Piraiki-Patraikihad argued, and Advocate General Van Thermaat
had recommended, 20 2 that all the applicants could be distinguished from other persons on the grounds that they were the only
Greek cotton undertakings in business at the time the decision was
adopted.20 3 The Court, however, held that the Greek cotton yarn
195. Id. at 228.
196. Id. at 245.
197. Id. at 244.
198. Id. at 243. Production and export of cotton yarn, in and of itself, was found to be
.a commercial activity which can be carried on at any time by any undertaking whatever."
Id.
199. Case 97/85, Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v. Commission, 1987
E.C.R. 2265, 2287, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,481, at
18496 (1987); see also Case C-152/88, Sofrimport SARL v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2477,
1-2507, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 597 (1988) (holding that applicants constituted "a restricted
group which [was] sufficiently well defined" to be individually concerned).
200. Union Deutsche, 1987 E.C.R. at 2287.
201. 1985 E.C.R. at 214 (quoting Plaumann).
202. Id. at 207, 218 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Van Thermaat of Oct. 14, 1982).
203. The Advocate General pointed to the Court's decisions in Toepfer and Bock, dealing with the retroactive effect of decisions on import licenses pending when the decisions
came into effect. With regard to those cases,
[t]he most crucial feature of that restriction strikes me as being . . . that the
Commission was in a position to know, when it adopted its decision, which undertakings-whose number and identity were clearly discernible-would be particularly and individually concerned by that decision. In this case, the Greek
producers who were engaged in the manufacture of cotton yarn at the material
time fall within that category. Thus the Court's decision in the Toepfer case could
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undertakings as a whole could not constitute a closed circle
because any enterprise could join that industry at any time, even if
20 4
practical barriers made it unlikely.
The sleight-of-hand here is not very sleight. In determining who
is concerned by a decision, the Court may use any of three different points in time as the cut-off for "closing" the class: before the
adoption of the decision, the moment of its adoption, or some point
after its adoption. 20 5 The Court found the general class of undertakings to be open by using a late cut-off, including in the class all
those who might become part of that category at any point after the
adoption of the decision. 20 6 The Court found the undertakings
with contracts in force to be a closed class by closing the category at
the time the decision was adopted. A different result occurs if those
cut-off points are reversed: As the Advocate General argued, the
undertakings generally were a "closed circle" if viewed at the time
of the adoption of the decision.2 0 7 Undertakings with contracts in
force need not be a closed circle if viewed as including any contracts that might be formed after the date of the decision.
Certainly, a logical reason exists for not including undertakings
contractually formed after the date of adoption of the decision.
From that point on, the initiators of the undertakings were
charged with knowledge of the economic consequences of contract
formation and could bear the burden of losses better than the
Community. That rationale, however, involves judgments of the
merits of the Community policy involved; it does not spring from
the logic of some a priori standing doctrine. The Plaumann formulation itself tells us nothing about when to employ the restrictive
time period. Ultimately, Plaumann leaves the Court where it
started: armed with standards and formulas that provide no normative basis for distinguishing between groups of applicants.
B.

The Norm Vacuum

The problem with standing doctrine is not that judges are unable, or unwilling, to consistently apply standards set out in the
be adopted almost word for word in order to support the conclusion that the
Greek producers' application is admissible.
Piraiki-Patraiki,1985 E.C.R. at 218 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Van Thermaat of Oct. 14,
1982).
204. Id. at 242-43.
205. Id. at 243-44.
206. Id. at 246.
207. Id. at 217, 218 (endorsing applicants' argument that they were distinguished by
virtue of being in business "at the time of the adoption of the decision").
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Treaty or doctrines articulated in earlier cases. Rather, the problem is that the Treaty and the Court's doctrines perceive standing
as a preliminary jurisdictional question, to be resolved using the
same standards across all subject areas. The requirements of standing generally, and individual concern in particular, however, lack
any normative standard to which judges may refer in answering the
question of whether the law intends to protect a particular applicant from the specific type of Community act. The answer to that
question inherently involves importation of some norm exogenous
to standing doctrine. The language of standing is merely the package in which the Court-consciously or unconsciously-wraps it for
presentation.
Critics illustrated this problem in the context of U.S. standing
doctrine and its "injury-in-fact" requirement. 20 8 The Supreme
Court first announced the injury in fact test, one of the primary
requirements for a plaintiff to gain access to the federal courts, in a
case concerning standing not under the Constitution, but under
the Administrative Procedure Act. 20 9 Courts now interpret the
"case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution
to require a plaintiff to show injury in fact. 2 10 Although earlier
cases linked the question of "legal injury" to the question of
208. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221 (1988); Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing,72 CAIF. L. REv. 68 (1984); see, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing
to Challenge Administrative Action: An InadequateSurrogatefor Claims for Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425
(1974) (concluding that "familiar rules of actionability and notions of legality, in conjunction with ordinary procedural practices, render a need for such opaque concepts as standing highly questionable"); David P. Currie, MisunderstandingStanding, 1981 Sup. CT. REv.
41 (detailing the Supreme Court's standing requirement and refusal to hear cases that
meet this requirement); Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (concluding that whether any source of law has
created a cause of action is a question for Congress to answer). For examples of the early
formulations of the standing requirement by Justices associated with the New Deal, see
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1938); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922).
209. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Professor
Fletcher and others have suggested that the law of standing in the U.S. did not exist at least
until the advent of the federal administrative state in the 1930s. Fletcher, supra note 208, at
224-25; Sunstein, supra note 208, at 170; see also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement , 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to
Secure JudicialReview: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Steven Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. Rev. 1371 (1988).
210. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying plaintiffs
standing on environmental claim for failure to show injury); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying plaintiff standing on claim for accounting of Central Intelligence Agency expenditures for failure to show injury).
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whether the plaintiff was part of the class protected by the claim on
which his suit was based, 21 1 the injury-in-fact requirement, like the
individual concern requirement of Article 173, is a preliminary
jurisdictional question, generally severable from the merits and
applicable in all cases.2 1 2 Thus, injury in fact is treated (as the
name suggests) as a question of objectively determinable fact which
does not involve normative judgments on the part of the decision2 13
maker.
Questions of injury under the law, however, inherently entail
normative judgments: Standing doctrines, to the extent that they
obscure those judgments, distort the perception of the actual process of deciding standing questions. Consider Professor Fletcher's
example: I am very concerned about the cutbacks in federal entitlements for the poor. I occasionally lose sleep after walking past
homeless people sleeping in the streets, a situation that I attribute
at least in part to the welfare reduction. I also feel obliged to
attempt to make up the difference myself, so I contribute large
sums of money to a homeless shelter. If I tried to bring an action
challenging federal welfare cutbacks, however, the law would
almost certainly find that these disturbances did not constitute
"injury in fact."2 1 4 In contrast, Professor Fletcher's neighbor chains
his dog in the back yard, just outside Professor Fletcher's window,
where the dog barks all night. 215 Professor Fletcher loses sleep, and

spends money on earplugs and a double glazed window.2 1 6 While
Professor Fletcher has "in fact" suffered the same injury as me, the

211. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 100-101 (3d ed. 1996);
Fletcher, supra note 208, at 224-25.
212. See Fletcher, supra note 208, at 231.
213. Id.
214. Fletcher, supra note 208, at 232. The prospect of "taxpayer suits," or cases brought
by any tax-paying member of the public to enforce the public obligations of the federal
government, has been largely rejected by the Supreme Court. See Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (holding that taxpayer lacked standing
to challenge conveyance of federal property to Christian college); Schlesinger v. Reservists
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding that taxpayer lacked standing to challenge
simultaneous membership in House of Representatives and U.S. military Reserves); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that taxpayer lacked standing to challenge law prohibiting public accounting of Central Intelligence Agency expenditures); see
also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denying right of taxpayer to bring suit
for injunction of expenditures made to reduce maternal and infant mortality). But see Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing taxpayer challenge to federal aid to religious
schools).
215. Fletcher, supra note 208, at 232.
216. Id.
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law recognizes Professor Fletcher's injury in an action for
217
nuisance.
The difference between Professor Fletcher's injury and mine is
not on the level of fact. Objectively, we have both lost sleep and
spent money. The difference lies in the norms expressed by the
legal rules underlying our claims. In my case, the law would view a
welfare recipient, or a person rendered ineligible for assistance by
the federal cutbacks, to be a more appropriate challenger of the
loss of those entitlements. In other words, I am not the person that
the system is intended to protect, thus the law will not recognize
any "injury" that I may feel I have suffered due to the cutbacks.
Professor Fletcher, on the other hand, is precisely the type of person that the law intends to protect through the cause of action for
nuisance. As a result, his injury "in fact" will also be recognized "at
law." In my case, a statement that no "injury" has occurred is based
not on factual observation, but on normative principle embodied
in the underlying claim-a question not of "is" but of "ought." In
such a statement, "[w]hat we mean, or should mean if we think
about it, is that [the plaintiff] is not hurt in a way that we wish the
2 18
courts to recognize."
Although Article 173(4) uses the language of "direct and individual concern," its requirements suggest substantially the same
inquiry as the "injury-in-fact" requirement: Like the American doctrine, the European individual concern requirement seeks to identify those persons who are "concerned" in a way that we wish the
courts to recognize. Substitute "concerned" for "injured" in Professor Fletcher's hypothetical: The result is the same and creates the
same confusion. 2 19 For example, in Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt GmbH v.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Eric Stein and G.Joseph Vining argue that the individual concern requirement is
more akin to the view of standing that prevailed in the U.S. before 1970, in which a party
could bring suit if it could prove that the challenged act threatened a protected legal right
of the litigant. Stein & Vining, supra note 10, at 234-35. They contrast that test with the new
test initiated by the Supreme Court in Ass'n ofData ProcessingServ. Orgs., 397 U.S. 150. Stein
& Vining, supra note 10, at 236-40. Either test, however, involves an appeal back to some
norm exogenous to standing doctrine. In the case of the common law test (analogous to
the former subjective public right requirement of German administrative law), that norm
was a legal right protected by contract, statute, or tort principles; id. at 235-36; in the case
of the new test (or the German "legally protected interest" test), that norm was more
broadly defined as the interest created in a class identifiable as intended beneficiaries of a
regulatory scheme. Id. at 237-40. While Stein and Vining seem to correctly characterize the
operative factor in the injury-in-fact test, perhaps the vantage point of 1976 allowed them
to ignore the fact that the Supreme Court was employing this test as if it illuminated the
standing question independent of the legal interests the plaintiffs sought to vindicate.
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Council,220 the measure at issue in fact affected only thirty raw sugar
producers in the Community. Economic considerations made raw
sugar production start-up businesses very unlikely. 22 1 Advocate
General Roemer argued that this defacto individualization sufficed
to constitute individual concern for the applicants. 222 The Court
of Justice disagreed. 223 The differing opinion between the Advocate General and the Court could not be satisfied on a factual basis.
The existing raw sugar producers were directly and exclusively
affected as a matter of empirical fact. The difference was not de
facto but dejure. Some principle outside standing suggested that the
raw sugar producers ought not be, in the view of the Community,
"individually concerned" by the measure.
Article 173(4) alone cannot determine standing as a purely factual matter. The Treaty requires judges to determine whether an
applicant is concerned in a way the Community wishes its law to recognize. That question is inherently normative, and requires an appeal
to some rule that can provide a standard for distinguishing
between those who are (through whatever idiosyncratic foible)
"concerned," and those who (according to the norms of the legal
system) ought to be. In other words, standing questions turn not on
some abstract principle of "individual concern" applicable across
all cases, but on the norms contained in the applicant's underlying
legal claim.
C.

The Empty Idea of Individual Concern

It might be argued that the Plaumann doctrine supplies the normative principle missing from the standing requirements of the
Treaty: the principle of equality. Plaumannstates that a person may
be individually concerned "by reason of certain attributes which
are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they
are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person
addressed." 2 24 The Plaumanndoctrine suggests that a party is individually concerned if affected by the act in equal measure as the
person addressed, and differently from the general population.
The argument, therefore, is that judges need only observe the
equality principle and find that any applicant who is like the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Case 6/68, 1968 E.C.R. 409, [1969] 8 C.M.L.R. 26 (1968).
Id. at 419 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Roemer of June 13, 1968).
Id.
Id. at 415.
1964 E.C.R. at 107.
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addressee of a decision should be treated in a like manner-that is,
should be given standing.
The principle that entities should have justice administered to
them in a like manner was elaborated by Aristotle, 225 building on
the works of Plato, 22 6 and remains an accepted principle in philosophy. 2 27 Both EC law and U.S. law enshrine the idea of equal treatment as a central tenet of political and social justice. 2 28
Scholars of both philosophy and law have argued, however, that
the enduring acceptance of the equality principle is due to the fact
that it expresses nothing but a tautology. 229 "People who are
alike," for purposes of the equality principle, may mean one of
three things. First, it may mean people who are alike in every
respect. But this, of course, is a null set. If this were its meaning,
the equality principle would have nothing whatever to say about
how people should be treated. Second, "people who are alike" may
mean people who are alike in some respects. This definition, however, is as standardless as the first, but for over-inclusiveness rather
than under-inclusiveness. In other words, no people are alike in
every respect, but all people are alike in some respect. 230 Third, the
equality principle may refer to people who are alike in some normatively relevant respect. 231 Of course, "[normatively] alike objects do
not exist in nature; [normative] alikeness is established only when
225.

See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a-1131b (W.D. Ross trans., 1925);

ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICA 1.5.1055b-1056b (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford at the Clarendon Press

2d ed. 1928).
226. PLATO, GORGtAS 507E-508A (B.Jowett trans., 1892); PLATO, LAws VI.757 (B.Jowett
trans., 1892); PLATO, PHAFDo 74 (B. Jowett trans., 1892); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC VIII.558 (B.
Jowett trans., 1892).
227. "To everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the notion of a certain equality. From Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas Aquinas, down to the jurists, moralists
and philosophers of our own day runs a thread of universal agreement on this point." C.
PERELMAN, THE IDEA OFJUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 12

(J. Petrie

trans., 1963).

228. In the United States, the primary embodiment of the equal treatment principle is
in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution: ". . . nor shall any
State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.

CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. In the EC, one important provision is Article 141 (formerly Article 119) of the EC Treaty: "Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should
receive equal pay for equal work." In both systems, these principles are enforced by secondary legislation.

229. See, e.g., John Locke, The Trivializability of Universalizability, 77 PHIL. REv. 25, 25
(1968); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 547-48 (1982); Bernard Williams, The Idea ofEquality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 110, 111 (P. Laslett

& W. Runciman eds., 1962).
230. Westen, supra note 229, at 544 n.180.
231. Id. at 544-45.
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people define categories." 23 2 To determine whether people should
be treated alike, one must refer to the norms underlying the treatment for which the people are being compared. For example, former U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle and I have both passed the
Indiana bar examination. Equally true, Mr. Quayle is male, and I
am female. Neither of these comparisons, in the abstract, tells us
anything about how Mr. Quayle and I should be treated. Whether
we are "alike" depends upon the purpose of the comparison and
the criteria we judge to be relevant for that purpose.
If we are being compared for purposes of admission to the Indiana bar, then we are alike and should be treated as such. People
who are admitted to the Indiana bar should be those people who
have passed the Indiana bar exam. In contrast, the fact that I am
female and Mr. Quayle is male should have no bearing on either of
our rights to be admitted. Suppose, however, that Mr. Quayle and I
are both auditioning for a part in the soprano section of the Metropolitan Opera chorus. While sopranos gain no advantage by being
lawyers, adult sopranos are nearly always women. Even if Mr.
Quayle has a very nice falsetto, the choral director would presumably be justified in refusing him and accepting me. Here, Mr.
Quayle and I are "unalike," and we should be so treated.
In each case, whether Mr. Quayle and I are alike and, therefore,
whether we should be treated alike, depends on the norms that we
have assigned to the categories for which we are performing the
comparison. If this observation is true, then equality is tautological.
It tells us that persons who are alike should be treated alike; but,
when we ask who is alike, it tells us "persons who should be treated
alike" according to the rule underlying our comparison. 233 It is
that rule, not the equality principle, that determines who is "in"
and who is "out."
There are four steps to this process of determining who is "alike"
and should be "treated alike." First, we must decide for what purpose we are making the comparison- that is, what treatment we are
proposing to afford or deny. Second, we must determine which
232. Id. at 545. I use the word "normative" in place of Westen's "moral" to avoid confusion. While any definition of the criteria of alikeness inherently involves judgment, that
judgment may derive just as easily from pragmatic as from metaphysical principles. The
difference, however, is ultimately semantic: By definition, anything that is normatively relevant implies fair analysis and selection. An arbitrary or unprincipled selection would unethically distribute treatment on the basis of criteria that we know to be unfair or the fairness
of which we have disregarded. Thus, only the ethical-the moral-selection of criteria can
truly be "normatively relevant."
233. Id.
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characteristics are .relevant to that treatment. For purposes of
admission to the Indiana bar, for example, successful completion
of the Indiana bar examination is a relevant criterion, and gender
is not. For purposes of admission to the soprano section of the
Met, the opposite is true. Third, we must determine which persons
possess the characteristic that we have determined to be morally
relevant. Finally, we must afford each person who possesses that
characteristic the treatment we are attempting to allocate, and we
must deny it to each person who lacks the relevant characteristic.
This formula determines how each person should be treated.
The real work here, however, is not accomplished at the stage of
comparison. The process of defining the categories by which two
people are to be judged alike or not alike must logically come first.
Once the relevant normative principle has been decided, people's
rights can be determined without comparison. Before we have
decided who should be admitted to the bar, we cannot tell whether
Mr. Quayle and I are "alike" or "unalike" for that purpose. Once we
have established as a normative principle that we will admit to the
bar all those who have passed the state bar examination, then I
have a right to be admitted, regardless of whether Mr. Quayle was
admitted or turned away. 234 Although the question can be framed
in terms of equality, that notion ultimately collapses into a simple
question of rights.
To say that two persons are the same in a certain respect is to
presuppose a rule-a prescribed standard for treating them-that
both fully satisfy. Before such a rule is established, no standard
of comparison exists. After such a rule is established, equality
between5 them is a "logical consequence of the established
2 3

rule."

It should come as no great surprise that the Plaumann formulation has been called "tautologous."' 23 6 The doctrine merely imbues
the non-normative language of Article 173(4) with the non-norma234. Some writers have argued that the equality principle merely guarantees that all
who are alike will either be given a certain treatment or not given a certain treatment, as
long as they are treated alike. See Westen, supra note 229, at 545 n.27 (citing sources). As a
moral principle, however, this could not have gained acceptance through the ages.
Another way of stating the equality principle is to say that "each person shall be given his
due." If each person should be given his due, and two persons are equal in the respect as
to which we are deciding what they are due, then each is due the same; each should be
treated the same. To say that we can either give these two people their due, or not give
them their due, as long as we do so equally, is not sustainable as a principle of justice. See
id. at 545-46.
235. Id. at 548 (quoting PERELMAN, supra note 227, at 38).
236. C.S.P. Harding, Decisions Addressed to Member States and Article 173 of the Treaty of
Rome, 25 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 15, 30 (1976).
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five language of the equality principle. The principle of equality
cannot be reduced to a sophistry giving substance to standing
because equality itself ultimately refers back to the purpose of the
comparison-i.e., to standing-to establish its own content. The
answer to the standing question must be located elsewhere.
IV.

A.

FILLING THE VACUUM

The "Judging"in the JudicialRole

Whether the question is that of Plaumann's equality principle-i.e., why the comparison is being made-or of Article 173's individual concern requirement-who was the law intended to
protect-the ultimate referent is the same: the underlying legal rule
or complex of rules that the applicant seeks to vindicate in a particular case. 2 37 The task of isolating the normative principle for individual concern determinations falls to the judiciary in each
individual case; Either the applicant is the type of person intended
to benefit from the protections of the underlying legal claim, or he
is not. Resolution of the question often turns on judicial interpretation of the legal rule, together with judicial evaluation of the particular situation of the applicant.
Consider, for example, the Greek cotton yarn case, A.E. PiraikiPatraiki v. Commission.23 8 In that case, the Court of Justice plainly
revealed its reliance on the norms of the underlying legal rules.
The Court found that, as for the contract-based argument, "the
admissibility of the application from that point of view must be
considered in conjunction with the substance of the case." 23 9 The
applicants' underlying claim was that the Commission failed to
observe the conditions laid down in Article 130 of the Act of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, upon which the decision was based.
More specifically, the applicants argued that the decision was not
restricted to the measures "strictly necessary" to prevent serious
240
economic disturbance in the relevant sector of the economy.
237. Some commentators have alluded to the failure of the individual concern requirement to give substance to standing and have suggested that the operative factor may be the
underlying legal interest. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 22, at 527; Nettesheim, supra note 18, at
234-38; Stein & Vining, supra note 10, at 229; Vandersanden, supranote 20, at 551. Of these
authors, only Craig attempts to explain the persistence of the individual concern test; he
proposes that the Court of Justice uses standing as a gatekeeper to control its docket in
CAP cases. No other author examines the operation of any alternative source of norms.
238. Case 11/82, 1985 E.C.R. 207, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 4 (1985).
239. Id. at 244.
240. Id. at 245.
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The Court recited Article 130(3), which provided that:
the measures authorized under paragraph (2) may involve derogations from the rules of the EEC Treaty and of this Act to such
an extent and for such periods as are strictly necessary in order
to attain the objectives referred to in paragraph (1). Priority
as will least disturb the functionshall be given to such measures
24 1
ing of the common market.
The Court held that Article 130(3) obligated the Commission to
"inquire into the negative effects which its decision might have on
the economy of that Member State as well as on the undertakings
concerned.
"'242 The inquiry required consideration of "the contracts which those undertakings, relying on the continuation of
free trade within the Community, have already been entered into
and whose execution will be wholly or partially prevented by the
decision authorizing the protective measure." 24 3 Article 130(3)
obligated the Commission to consider these undertakings, and, as
a result, the Court found those representing the undertakings indi244
vidually concerned by the Commission's decision.
Article 130(3) did not expressly instruct the Court as to who
should be entitled to benefit from its protections, but clearly contemplated some protection for someone. Interpreting that provision in accordance with similar provisions in the EEC Treaty, 245 the
Court ruled that the measure should be viewed as protecting Greek
undertakings with export contracts in force before the date of
adoption of the decision. 24 6 The normative principle lacking in
either the individual concern language of the Treaty or the equality language of Plaumann was supplied by Article 130(3), upon
which the applicants based their claim. Interpreting that provision
teleologically, the Court held that the contract applicants-but not
the general class of applicants-were the type of persons that the
law meant to protect from the illegalities alleged. 2 47 Accordingly,
the contract applicants alone had standing.

241. Id. (quoting Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Hellenic Republic
and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 1979 O.J. (L 291) 17, art. 130(3) [hereinafter Acr OF
ACCESSION]).

242.
243.
244.
245.
cle 130
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Piraiki-Patraiki,1985 E.C.R. at 245.
Id. Article 226 of the EEC Treaty was identical in wording and in purpose to Artiof the Act of Accession. EEC TREATY art. 226; Acr OF AccEsSION, art. 130.
Piraiki-Patraiki,1985 E.C.R. at 247.
Id.
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That ruling - like any ruling on individual concern - involved
the four steps noted above 248 with regard to the equality principle.
First, the Court identified the rights that the underlying complex
of rules represented. Second, the Court isolated the normatively
relevant characteristics that describe the person for whom such
protection was intended. Third, the Court examined each of the
applicants for the presence or absence of those characteristics.
Finally, the Court granted standing to the applicants who possessed
the normatively relevant characteristics and denied it to those who
did not.
The 'judging" inherent in the first step has already been demonstrated in the example of Piraiki-Patraiki:When the legal rule providing the basis for the claim does not spell out the rights it intends
to preserve, judges must use familiar methods of legal interpretation to identify those rights. 249 In the realm of law, the second step
almost always involves critical value judgments as well: To determine the types of persons who will be entitled to claim the rights
identified, judges must sort among the infinite variation of qualities of possible beneficiaries and identify those that seem to best
represent the normative principle that society intended that law to
create. Although it may be a relatively simple matter to determine,
2 50
for example, the relevant characteristics constituting an orange,
it is a much more complex matter to identify the relevant characteristics of (in the case of the Greek yarn case) the intended beneficiary of rules limiting derogation from the common market
presumption. That status may be reflected in a combination of several characteristics or equally by a preponderance of just one or
two of those characteristics. Again, the task falls to judges to make
fine distinctions between those factors, or combinations of factors,
that characterize the protected class and those that do not. Step
two, then, is in a sense inextricably linked to step three: Because
each applicant is distinct, the judge will likely be unable to anticipate each particular combination of factors making up the applicant's claim to relevance. Instead, in practice, the judge will form a
general sense of the types of factors that should constitute a successful claim, then analyze each applicant's peculiar combination,
and finally determine whether it constitutes a sufficient claim for
the protection afforded by the underlying legal rule.
248.
249.

See supra Part III.C.
Id. at 209-10.

250.

See Westen, supra note 229, at 552-53.
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To see this point, consider again Piraiki-Patraiki.The applicants
in that case could be categorized and subcategorized according to
the status of their contracts. The Court, in interpreting the proper
scope of protection provided by Article 130(3) of the Act of Accession, rejected the claims of the cotton yarn producers generally,
tacitly rejecting the claims of those who only had formed contracts
after the notification date. 25 1 The Court noted the protection provided by the Commission for the undertakings with goods already
shipped 252 and held that the same protections should be afforded
to those undertakings with any contracts formed before the notifi25 3
cation date.
Each of these judgments, when measured against the language
and purpose of Article 130(3), can be readily justified. While Article 130(1) recognized the possible need for temporary protections
for some sectors of a Member State's economy during the period
of accession, Article 130(3) mitigated that principle by promising
25 4
some unspecified level of assurance for the Greek economy.
Although those two provisions, read together, give judges some
guidance as to the undertakings and the circumstances in which
such undertakings might be entitled to protection, the exact placement of that line would inevitably depend upon the particular circumstances-i.e., the level of "disturb[ance in] the functioning of
the common market" 255 -demonstrated by the applicants actually
before the Court. In this case, the Court reasoned that the disturbance was sufficiently serious to trump Article 130(1) in the case of
those businesses that were contractually bound before they possessed complete information. In those cases, Article 130, as a
whole, granted a legal interest in the undertakings. In cases where
the formation of future contracts had merely been prevented or
where the applicants had been notified of the decision but decided
to form contracts anyway, however, the concerns of Article 130(1)
were paramount, and the undertakings sustained no legal interest
protected by the Act.
Although these judgments are reasonable in light of Article 130,
they are, indeed, judgments. The Court had to rely on traditional
principles of adjudication to draw the line between the two categories of undertakings with attendant legal interests under Article
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Piraiki-Patraiki,1985 E.C.R. at 243-44.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Acr OF ACCESSION, art. 130(3).
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130 and the two without such interests. Each presented some complex of characteristics that militated in favor of protection; each
could have been excluded on various bases. Ultimately, the Court
made distinctions based on the type and amount of harm that each
would suffer and the reasonableness of requiring the Community
to bear the cost of that particular type of harm. The distinction was
one of degree, not of kind. All of the undertakings faced financial
losses as a result of the decision, and all of those losses could have
been averted (or compensated) by weighting the consideration
entirely in favor of the Greek undertakings. After weighing all
these factors in light of Article 130 and teleological principles of
Community law, the Court drew the line where it did.
With this view of the process of adjudicating individual concern,
Advocate General Cosmas's opinion in GreenpeaceII looks less and
less revolutionary. The apparent novelty in that opinion consisted
of two doctrinal movements. First, by equating legal interest with
individual concern, the Advocate General openly proposed that
standing determinations are necessarily linked to the norms represented by the underlying complex of legal rules. 256 Second, by
acknowledging the distinctions in degree of harm that the Court
would have to make between differently situated environmental
applicants, the Advocate General illuminated the exercise of judi2 57
cial discretion inherent in each step of standing adjudication.
In short, the collective rights cases only look different. Because
the rights in those cases are diffuse, it is apparent that judges will
have to use discretion to make distinctions of degree between
affected persons. The process of adjudicating individual concern,
however, always involves such line-drawing, such quantitative distinctions, even in the "traditional" case. Neither "individual concern" nor "equality" imparts any norms by which those distinctions
can be made. Therefore, in every case, it is the legal interest created by the underlying norms that guides judges in admitting some
applicants and turning others away.
In effect, the opinion of the Advocate General, which at a glance
appeared to proffer an expansion of the judicial role, did no more
than elaborate a role that the judiciary had already exercised and
inevitably must play in resolving any standing questions for nonprivileged applicants. Since collective rights cases are not a new category of individual concern cases, admitting one need not open
256.
1997).
257.

Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1695-96 (opinion ofAdvoc. Gen. Cosmas of Sept. 23,
Id. at 1-1694.

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 32

the gates to a flood of others. Every applicant, whether alleging
collective rights or not, will rise or fall on its own ability to show,
first, a legal interest created by the underlying norms and, second,
a relative degree of harm that the Community wishes to recognize
by its law.
B.

JudicialDiscretion in the StandingJurisprudence of the Court
ofJustice

A preliminary look at the case law of the Court of Justice supports the thesis that the analysis proposed by Advocate General
Cosmas to address collective rights cases involved the same steps
that have operated subtextually in every individual concern adjudication. While this paper does not aspire to rationalize all Community standing jurisprudence, applying these principles to justify a
few apparent inconsistencies in that case law provides anecdotal
evidence of the importance of the analysis to resolve all individual
concern cases.
Throughout the course of development of the individual concern doctrine, various applicants have argued that they should be
considered to be individually concerned because of their peculiar
position in the affected market. The argument has met with mixed
success in a pattern not apparently justifiable in terms of "individual concern" or "differentiat [ion]" or "closed circles." For example, in Glucoseries Rgunies v. Commission,2 58 a case decided a year
after Plaumann, the applicant argued that it was individually concerned by a measure affecting glucose imports into France,
because it was the only Belgian glucose exporter in a position to
supply the requisite quantity during the specified period. 25 9 The
Court rejected the argument, stating that the applicant was not
individually concerned, "even if the latter does occupy the position
which it claims on the Belgian market with respect to glucose
260
exports to France."
Similarly, in Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission26 1 and Union
Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v. Commission,2 62 the applicant's
unique position on the market failed to persuade the Court that
the applicants were individually concerned. In Spijker Kwasten, the
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
(CCH)

Case 1/64, 1964 E.C.R. 413, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 596 (1964).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
Case 231/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2559, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 284 (1984).
Case 97/85, 1987 E.C.R. 2265, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
14,481, at 18,496 (1987).
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Court held that its ruling of inadmissibility was "not invalidated by
the fact that the applicant . .. is the only trader-importer established in the Benelux States (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) regularly importing into the Netherlands brushes
originating in the People's Republic of China." 263 In Deutsche
Lebensmittelwerke, the Court denied individual concern, stating that,
"although the contested decision affects the applicants, that is only
because of the effects it produces on their position on the
264
market."
In contrast, in COFAZ v. Commission,265 the Court found a challenge admissible based on the applicants' participation in the procedure leading up to the decision and the fact that "their position
on the market is significantly affected by the aid which is the subject of the contested decision." 266 Likewise, in Extramet Industrie SA
v. Council,26 7 the Court held that the applicant was individually concerned, in part because it was "the largest importer of the product
forming the subject-matter of the anti-dumping measure and, at
the same time, the end-user of the product," whose "business activities depend to a very large extent on those imports and are seriously affected by the contested regulation in view of the limited
68
number of manufacturers" of the product in the Community.2
The Court may not have intended to limit the right of standing
based on market position to the anti-dumping or state aid fields. In
CodorniuSA v. Council,2 69 Advocate General Lenz relied on Extramet
for the proposition that "for the first time the economic effects are the
sole criterion" of individual concern 2 70 and proposed that Codorniu
was "distinguished from the category of traders affected by the
effects which the measure has on its undertaking."' 271 The Court
found the application admissible, arguably endorsing the Advocate
272
General's reasoning.
263. Spijker Kwasten, 1983 E.C.R. at 2566.
264. Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke, 1987 E.C.R. at 2287.
265. Case 169/84, 1986 E.C.R. 391, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 385 (1986).
266. Id. at 415-16.
267. Case C-358/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619 (1991).
268. Id. at 1-2532.
269. Case C-309/89, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561 (1994).
270. Id. at 1-1868 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Lenz of Oct. 27, 1992) (emphasis in
original).
271. Id. at 1-1872.
272. The Advocate General noted that the applicant had used the trademark "Gran
Cremant" for its product since 1924. Codorniu, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-1886. The Court's reasoning
was elliptical: Codorniu was individually concerned because the regulation prevented it
from using its registered trademark. Id. Some commentators argue for attributing the
Advocate General's reasoning to the Court of Justice to explain its judgment. See Arnull,
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In Buralux SA v. Counci,2 73 however, the Court again held that a
particularly affected market position was not grounds for a finding
of individual concern. Despite the fact that the applicants were
"practically the only operators who transport waste from Germany
to France" 2 74 and had transportation contracts, the applicants were
not individually concerned by a regulation under which France
prohibited the importation of household wastes. The Court held
that the applicants were affected "only in their objective capacity as
economic operators in the business of waste transfer between
Member States, in the same way as any other operator in that
275
business."
In Glucoseries Runies, Spijker Kwasten, Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke,
and Buralux, market position does not matter; in COFAZ, Extramet,
and Codorniu it does. In each of these cases, the applicant challenged a regulation or decision that might be characterized as
applying to all undertakings in a particular business. In each of
these cases, new undertakings might be formed later than and be
affected by the measure. All of the cases purportedly involved interpretation of the same language of Article 173(4) and the Plaumann
doctrine.
Of course, two of these cases, COFAZ and Extramet, are "special
category" cases. As argued earlier, however, nothing in these provisions explains a more lenient standard for determining individual
concern. 27 6 The Court in Codorniu, apparently following the reasoning of Advocate General Lenz, signaled that the permissive standard was not reserved for these categories.
In fact, cases like COFAZ and Extramet provide the starting point
for explaining away the discrepancies. The "special category" cases
are not really special at all. In those cases, the Court merely
employs a more transparent analysis. The Court begins by identifying the Community policy underlying the regulation or decision by
naming the "special category." With that policy in mind, the Court
considers the position of the applicant in the case at hand and asks
whether the applicant's peculiar mix of characteristics qualifies it
Introduction, supra note 10, at 46; see also Waelbroeck & Fosselard, supra note 109 at 262-63.
But see Hedemann-Robinson, supra note 22, at 150-51 (positing that "it is by no means clear
whether [the Court of Justice] agreed with the Advocate General's view that the criterion
of impact analysis was the correct test to apply").
273. Case C-209/94 P, 1996 E.C.R. 1-615.
274. Id. at 1-647.
275. Id. at 1-646.
276. See supra notes 163-181 and accompanying text.
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for protection under the norms established by the Community policy at issue.
Thus, for instance, in antidumping cases 27 7 producers and
exporters may be individually concerned because they are clearly
affected by the regulation but, as non-Community nationals, ordinarily have no recourse to challenge the acts in national courts. 278
Complainants, which have "a legitimate interest in the initiation of
protective action by the Community," therefore "have a right of
action within the framework of the legal status which the [parent]
regulation confers upon them." 279 Importers, who paid the
antidumping duties to national authorities, were viewed as having
recourse before the national authorities. 280 Perhaps because of the
inefficiencies of that procedure, 281 the Court of Justice relaxed
individual concern to admit several importers as well. 28 2
277. Antidumping duties may be imposed on imports into the Community when (a)
the export price of the imported product is less than its usual value in the exporting country; and (b) the result injures a Community industry. Council Regulation 2423/88 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not Members of the
European Economic Community, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1.
278. Anthony Arnull, ChallengingEC Anti-Dumping Regulations: The Problem of Admissibility, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv.73, 76 (1992); seeJoined Cases 239 & 275/82, Allied Corp.
v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 1005, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 572 (1984) (holding that an exporter
individually concerned where prices considered as part of preliminary investigation fixing
level of antidumping duty); Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, 1979 E.C.R.
1185, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 257 (1979) (holding an exporter individually concerned where
identified in the regulation).
279. Case 191/82, Fediol v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, 2936, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R.
244, 268 (1983); see also Case C-367/95 P, Commission v. Chambre Syndicale Nationale des
Entreprises de Transport de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval) and Brink's France SARL, 1998
E.C.R. 1-1719, I-1766 (explaining that complainants "undeniably qualify as persons entitled
to the benefit of the procedural guarantees" of Article 93(2)); Case 264/82, Timex Corp. v.
Council and Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 849, 866, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 550, 567 (1985) (finding a complainant individually concerned where investigation procedure influenced by
complainant's initial observations and where Commission noted effect of dumping on
complainant in preamble to regulation).
280. See Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, Allied Corp. v Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 1005,
1030, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 572, 613 (1984).
281. See Arnull, supra note 278, at 78.
282. See Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v.
Commission and Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2945, 1-2945 (finding an importer individually concerned where associated with particular exporter and involved in Commission's preliminary investigation); Joined Cases 277 & 300/85, Canon Inc. v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5731,
5769, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 915, 919 (1988) (finding an importer individually concerned
where importers' prices considered in fixing duty); see also Onno W. Brouwer & Fiona
Carlin, Qualiti pour agir dans les procedures anti-dumping aprs l'arrit extramet, 17 DROIT ET
PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 243, 260 (1991) (noting Court ofJustice's reliance

before Extramet on alternative for importers before national courts as part of "systime de
voies de recours").
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In Extramet, the applicant was individually concerned because
the Court determined that the norms embodied in Community
antidumping laws are best served by recognizing an individual legal
interest on the part of an independent importer who was referred
to in the preamble to the regulation. 283 The independent
importer would be severely affected particularly by the established
antidumping duties in light of its market position. 284 Similarly, in
the state aid context, the Court of Justice in COFAZ held that Community policy, established by Articles 87 and 88 (formerly Articles
92 and 93) on state aid, must be understood to protect individuals
who play an important role in the investigation procedure and who
are significantly economically affected by the alleged state aid. 28 5
Because the COFAZ applicants fit this description, they were individually concerned by the Commission's decision to terminate the
investigation.

28 6

The apparent disparity among the market-position cases can be
explained by analyzing them according to the method of adjudication employed in Extramet and COFAZ. Glucoseries Runies, Spijker
Kwasten, and Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke all involved challenges to
Commission decisions under Community agricultural or customs
policies. 28 7 In order for the Community to effectuate policies
283. Extramet, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2530.
284. Id. at 1-2532.
285. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at 414-16.
286. Some commentators identify a "special category" consisting of one case, Case 294/
83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 343 (1986); see, e.g., Vandersanden, supra note 20, at 542 (calling Les Verts
"inclassable"); see also R. Kovar, Casenote, L'arretLes Verts, 23 CAHIERs DE DRorr EUROPE9N
314, 373-74 (1987); Marc Thill, Le difaut de qualiti du Parlement europen pour agiren annulation au titre de lArticle 173 du trait CEE: l'arret de la cour de justice du 27 septembre 1988 et ses
implications sur d'autres aspects du contentieux communautaire,25 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPERN
367 (1989). Rather than any special category-of-one, Les Verts can be understood as a case
in which the underlying legal norms, relating to access to democratic process, clearly
bestowed a legal interest upon new political parties seeking funding for campaigns for the
European Parliament. The result of the individual concern issue in Les Verts follows logically from the judicial interpretation inherent in any standing analysis. In contrast, teleological principles of Community law did not support standing for the EP itself in the
Comitology case. In that case, the Court ofJustice reviewed the underlying Treaty provisions
and found that Community law did not grant an interest to the EP to bring actions for
annulment. Case 302/87, European Parliament v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5615, 5644 [hereinafter Comitology]. For a concise explanation of this distinction between Les Verts and
Comitology, see Alan Dashwood, The European Parliament and Article 173 EEC: The Limits of
Interpretation, in CURRENT IssuEs IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Robin White &
Bernard Smythe eds., 1990).
287. Indeed, if the experience of the 1980s is still representative, the majority of cases
before the Court of Justice involve challenges to agricultural or customs policy. Christopher Harding, Who Goes to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Litigation against the European
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involving a high degree of investigation, analysis, and (inevitably)
discretion, the Community institutions responsible for implementation of those policies must be given broad leeway to act. The
Treaty articles establishing the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) 288 and the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 28 9 cannot be
understood to create a legal interest in every competitor in the
affected market without effectively paralyzing the Community's
attempt to create common policies. Lacking a legal interest, market competitors lack standing to challenge adjustments to their sec2 90
tor of the market.
For example, in DeutscheLebensmittelwerke, the German margarine
producers contested a decision that established an experiment
aimed at increasing the demand for butter. 29 1 According to the
decision, the German government was required to contract for the
distribution of one 250-gram stick of butter, marked "free EEC but29 2
ter," packaged with one 250-gram stick sold on the open market.
A total of 900 tons of surplus Community butter stock was distributed, and a marketing survey assessed the effectiveness of the measure in increasing demand.2 93 On the whole, the applicants
claimed that the Commission did not properly assess the condiCommunity, 17 EUR. L. REv. 105, 115 (1992). From 1980-89, 56.4% of cases in Court of
Justice involved agriculture (largest category of cases) and 7.4% involved customs/movement of goods (third-largest category of cases). Id.
288. EC TREATY arts. 32-38 (formerly arts. 38-47).
289. EC TREATY arts. 131-134 (formerly arts. 110-115).
290. Professor Craig has argued that the Court uses a restrictive interpretation of individual concern in the CAP cases to avoid reviewing the Commission's complex and specialized discretionary judgments and to control the size of its docket. Craig, supra note 22, at
524-26. As Craig states,
[t]he ECJ ... does not wish to be placed in a position whereby it is being constantly asked to second guess the discretionary choices made by the other Community institutions. This would swamp the Court with cases of this kind. It would
also be inappropriate for the Court simply to substitute its view on the 'correct'
balance between the objectives set out in Article 39 for that of the Commission
and the Council.
Id. at 525. According to Craig, the Court uses a second tool, lenient standards of review, to
achieve the same ends. Id. at 525-26. While this explanation seems to have merit, it does
not explain cases like Codorniu, which also involved a challenge to a CAP regulation, or
Buralux,which did not. Nevertheless, viewed from a slightly different angle, the discretionary nature of the underlying Community policy may, in fact, be the key to the Court's
individual concern rulings in many CAP cases.
291. Case 97/85, Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v. Commission, 1987
E.C.R. 2265, 2267, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,481, at
18,494-95 (1987).
292.

Id.

293.

Id.
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tions of the dairy'and margarine markets in taking the contested
2 94
decision.
Each of the principles upon which their objection was founded
would have required the Court to revisit the facts gathered by the
Commission, review its quantitative and theoretical analysis of that
market, invent and weigh alternative measures, and evaluate the
effect of each on the margarine market.2 95 If competitors, and
especially competitors in a parallelmarket, had the legal right to
demand such a review of every Commission action, the Commission would be reluctant to take any action at all; any actions it did
take would be subject to attack from various corners. The CAP
would be ineffectual at best. In that light, the Court's ruling of
inadmissibility must have been correct: The Community norms
embodied by the CAP cannot include a legal interest in parallel
market competitors to challenge Commission decisions designed
to increase demand for, and reduce surplus of, a particular agricultural product.
Similarly, in Glucoseries R6unies, the applicant was a Belgian glucose exporter who objected to a Commission decision permitting
France to place levies on those imports. 296 The contested decision 297 was based on an earlier decision, 298 which dictated certain
conditions under which Member States would be permitted to take
protective measures against processed agricultural products from
other Member States. Again, the Community would be prevented
from effectuating its policy for the organization of markets for
294. The applicants claimed that the decision breached numerous principles: freedom
to carry on business; market stabilization; non-discrimination between Community producers; protection of legitimate expectations of the market; and proportionality. Id. at 2270-75,
2285. They also alleged that the decision improperly violated German competition law,
that it lacked any enabling basis listed in the underlying regulation, and that the Commission failed to notify the Council of its intention to carry out the program. Id.

295. Id.
296. Case 1/64, 1964 E.C.R. 413, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 596 (1964). The decision challenged by Glucoseries R~unies was adopted pursuant to Article 235 on implied powers,
rather than Article 40 on the Common Agricultural Policy, because glucose was considered
a food processed from agricultural products governed by that Treaty provision. Id. at 416
(opinion of Advoc. Gen. Roemer ofJuly 2, 1964). For present purposes, however, organization of a common market for processed agricultural products presents the same policy
objectives and difficulties, and consequently the same type of analysis of legal interests, as
organization of the primary agricultural products market.
297. Commission Decision 63/664 of 28 November 1963 Authorizing the French Government to Levy a Countervailing Duty on the Import of Glucose (Dextrose) from Certain
Member-States, 1963J.O. (183) 2914.
298. Council Decision of 4 April 1962 Pr6voyant la Perception D'une Taxe Compensatoire Sur Certaines Marchandises Resultant de la Transformation de Produits Agricoles,
1962 J.O. (23) 999.
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processed agricultural products if every competitor were entitled to
demand a qualification of the Commission's quantitative and theoretical analysis of market conditions. The Commission's policy
could not have intended to embody such a broad legal protection,
and the Court's decision to deny standing is easily justifiable.
In Spiker Kwasten, the applicants challenged a decision under
the Common Customs Tariff governing the importation of brushes
from the People's Republic of China. 299 Although neither the
judgment nor the opinion of the Advocate General details the
applicant's objections to that policy, its claim seemed to involve
review of the propriety of applying protective measures to those
products until a certain date. 30 0 Complex and inherently discretionary in nature, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), like the
CAP, could not be effectuated if it granted parties in affected
undertakings the general right to challenge decisions made with
respect to it. The Court appropriately found that the applicant was
not individually concerned by a decision administering that
30 1
policy.
This focus on the interests protected by the underlying legal
rules, however, also allows the Court to occasionally find individual
concern even in cases involving discretionary policies like CAP and
CCP. If the right the applicant seeks to vindicate is specific, narrow,
and consistent with the policy aims established by the legal rules
from which it arises, the Court may find that norms embodied by
those rules confer a legal interest on a certain type of individual.
This fine-brush approach to analysis of the underlying legal rules
can explain the Court's judgment in Codorniu. The applicant
30 2
sought to challenge a regulation adopted pursuant to CAP.
More specifically, however, Codorniu claimed that the contested
regulation discriminated on the basis of nationality by restricting
the use of the term "cr6mant" to French and Luxembourgish producers of sparkling wines. 30 3 Although the norms underlying Community agricultural policy may not include a right for every injured
299. Case 231/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2559, 2561, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 284, 285 (1984).
300. Id. at 2564.
301. Id. at 2566.
302. Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853, 1-1887, [1995] 2
C.M.L.R. 561, 588 (1994).
303. Id. Although the applicant presented several bases for its theory, including Article
7 (nationality discrimination), Article 40(3) (discrimination between producers), Article
42 (competition in CAP), and the principles of proportionality and equal treatment as well
as misuse of powers and breach of essential procedural requirements, all of those bases
related to the same theory: that the regulation unfairly discriminated against Spanish sparkling wine producers on the basis of nationality alone. See id. Both Advocate General Lenz
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party to an undertaking to demand an accounting from the Commission, those policies will be consistent with foundational Community principles only if they protect an agricultural undertaking
from subjection to unjustified nationality discrimination in the
form of CAP regulations. In that case, the underlying policy is
more than CAP; it is CAP as limited by Article 14 (formerly Article
7a) of the EC Treaty, establishing a Community without internal
frontiers. On that analysis, the Court correctly found that
Codorniu, unlike most CAP challengers, possessed a legal interest
30 4
arising from the legal rules upon which its claim was based.
In Buralux, the Court recognized the relevance of the underlying
law in distinguishing the case at hand from the Greek cotton yarn
case. 30 5 The Buralux applicants relied on Piraiki-Patraikibecause
they, like some of the Greek cotton yarn producers, had already
formed contracts that were frustrated by the Commission measure.30 6 The Court, however, relied upon the differences between
a Community-wide waste management framework provided by the
regulation at issue in Buralux and the Act of Accession of the Hel3 0 7 In addition to the more genlenic Republic in Piraiki-Patraiki.
eral nature of the Buralux regulation, 30 8 the Court emphasized that
the Act of Accession required the Commission to take into account
the negative effects of its decision on the Greek economy and, particularly, the impact upon contracts already formed.3 0 9 The Court
did not find any such requirements in the regulatory scheme chal310

lenged by the Buralux applicants.

The Court's discussion of individual concern in Buralux
observed that the limited number of affected parties failed to establish individual concern,3 1 1 that the applicants were therefore
affected only in their "objective capacity as economic operators" in
the instant business, 312 and that the finding was not mitigated by
and the Court dealt only with the direct discrimination argument. See id. at 1-1873-78 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Lenz of Oct. 27, 1992); 1-1887-89 (judgment of the Court).
304. See Nihoul, supra note 174, at 186 (explaining judgment of admissibility in
Codorniu as consequence of Court's view on merits that regulation violated equality
principle).
305. Case C-209/94 P, 1996 E.C.R. 1-615, 1-644.
306. Id. at 1-643.
307. Id. at 1-647.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1-648.
310. Id.
311. 1996 E.C.R. at 1-646-47.
312. Id.
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the applicants' special position in the market. 3 13 Those recitals
alone, however, couched in the abstract formulation of the
Plaumann doctrine, 3 14 are incapable of distinguishing the applicants in Buralux, whom the Court did not find individually concerned, from those in Piraiki-Patraiki,who were found individually
concerned. While the requirements of the Act of Accession for
Greece provide half the distinction, the other half lies in the legal
norms relied upon by the Buralux applicants. Council Regulation
259/93315 was adopted in accordance with Article 130 of the EEC
Treaty on environmental policy. The applicants challenged Article
4(3) (a) (i) of the regulation, which provided that Member States
could take measures in accordance with the Treaty "to prohibit
generally or partially or to object systematically to shipments of
waste." 3 16 That article effectively approved a French decree
3 17
prohibiting all domestic waste importation.
As Advocate General Cosmas pointed out in his opinion in Greenpeace II, the Treaty provisions relating to environmental policy create affirmative obligations upon the public authorities, but do not
create corresponding rights on behalf of individuals. 318 Any individual legal interest in enforcing environmental policy derives
from specific provisions of secondary Community environmental
law that the courts find to have direct effect. 31 9 In Buralux, the
applicants did not point to any legislation granting them rights to
be balanced in establishing Community environmental policy. The
313. Id. at 1-647.
314. The Court cited Case 26/86, Deutz und Geldermann, Sektkellerei Breisach/
Baden GmbH v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 941, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R1 668, which in turn paraphrased the Plaumann doctrine. Buralux, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-646.
315. Council Regulation 259/93, art. 4, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1, 5.
316. Id. art. 4(3)(a)(i).
317. The applicants claimed that the regulation gave inconsistent reasons for its adoption; unjustifiably restricted the free movement of goods; infringed the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity, and legitimate expectations; and constituted a misuse of powers.
Buralux, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-632-37 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Lenz of Nov. 23, 1995).
318. Creenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1670-72 (opinion ofAdvoc. Gen. Cosmas of Sept. 23,
1997).
319. For example, Advocate General Cosmas cited the Court's decision in Case C-131/
88, Commission v. Germany, 1991 E.C.R 1-825, 1-866-67, finding that Council Directive 80/
68/EEC of 17 December 1979, Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution, 1980 O.J. (L
20) 43, contained provisions sufficiently specific and detailed to bestow legal rights and
obligations on individuals. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1673 (opinion of Advoc. Gen.
Cosmas of Sept. 23, 1997); see also id. at 1-1673-74 (citing other cases recognizing the direct
effect of secondary Community legislation relating to the environment). The Greenpeace
applicants' argument relied on the individual legal interests created by certain provisions
of Directive 85/337/EEC in conjunction with the specific obligation of the Community
institutions to monitor funded projects for environmental compliance. See supra notes 8190 and accompanying text.
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absence of such rights is unsurprising. Community environmental
policy, like CAP or CCP, involves the exercise of significant discretion. Invariably, the lawmaking bodies of the Community will have
to weigh the harm to some interests against the harm to the environment in striking the proper balance of environmental protection. With the exception of certain "specific and detailed"
provisions, environmental legislation could not effectively grant
justiciable legal rights to all undertakings that might be adversely
affected by environmental regulations, or the lack thereof. In light
of the need for broad discretion in that policy area, the Court's
finding that the applicants lacked individual concern is sensible.
Moreover, that finding can easily be distinguished from the ruling
in Piraiki-Patraiki.The Act of Accession of Greece contained a provision expressly mitigating the effects of the temporary derogation
from the policy of open markets, creating at least a thin cushion
against the economic effects of that policy.3 20 The environmental
legislation at issue in Buralux did not contain any similar mitigating
norm, thus the applicants in Buralux had no protection against the
3 21
necessary economic impact of Community environmental policy.
If these cases are representative of the Court of Justice's individual concern jurisprudence,3 22 then the collective rights cases do
not present the constitutional or prudential problems that at first
glance might be feared. While standing can be granted in collective rights cases only when Community norms create a specific
legal interest, that showing is no different than the one required of
any applicant. While the Court must draw lines between degrees of
harm to potential applicants, the Court must do so in every case to
distinguish those who, according to Community policy, should be
concerned from those who, in objective fact, are concerned. A collective rights case like Greenpeace II is just a garden-variety individ-

320.

Acr

OF ACCESSION,

art. 130(3).

321. Further support for this characterization may be found in Case C-152/88,
Sofrimport SARL v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2477, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 597 (1988). The
Court found, in that case, that traders with apples already in transit from Chile should have
been exempted from regulations suspending the issue of import licenses for Chilean dessert apples. The Court pointed to a Community regulation establishing the conditions for
applying protective measures for fruits and vegetables, which required the Commission to
take account of goods already in transit to the Community. Id. at 1-2507 (citing Council
Regulation 2707/72, art. 3(3), 1972 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 291) 3). The Court held that "since
Article 3 of Regulation No 2707/72 gives specific protection to those importers, they must
therefore be able to enforce observance of that protection and bring legal proceedings for
that purpose." Id.
322. See supra Part III.
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ual rights case, presenting oft-repeated challenges and no special
risks.
V.

STANDING FOR PUBLIC INTERESTS IN GREENPEACE II

A.

Legal Interest and Impact Nexus

Should the Greenpeace II applicants have had standing? If the
Court of Justice had perceived GreenpeaceII as just another individual concern case, it probably could have dispensed with the direct
concern objection. Free of the worries that admitting Greenpeace H
would unconstitutionally extend its jurisdiction or would leave the
Court without justification for refusing other collective rights cases,
the Court might have conducted its usual individual concern analysis. If the legal measures invoked by the applicants granted protection of a specific legal interest to some individuals, then some
applicants might have standing. If the applicants at the bar had
shown sufficient nexus to the harm alleged, then they might have
standing and Greenpeace II could have been admitted. Collective
rights cases require the same adjudication process as other individual concern cases, thus admitting Greenpeace II would not run afoul
of the limitations of Article 173(4). Collective rights cases are not a
new category of individual concern cases. Each successive application will rise or fall on its own merits.
As with any issue of individual concern, the first task is to identify
any legal interests created by the complex of rules underlying the
applicant's claim. The Greenpeace II applicants pointed to two
sources, both mentioned in the Preamble to the contested Decision: (1) the environmental Regulation, pursuant to which the
Decision was adopted; and (2) the environmental Directive, with
which the project was required to comply.323 Although the Treaty
provisions only created environmental obligations for the national
and Community authorities without corresponding individual
rights of enforcement, 24 the applicants argued that the environmental Directive and Regulation created enforceable individual
interests.
The applicants' arguments as to those measures, although not
without complications, ultimately seem persuasive. The Decision
included a provision for reduction or suspension of funding if the
project did not comply with its requirements. 3 25 Those require323.
324.
325.

See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
Commission Decision 91/440 (C), supra note 1, art. 5.
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ments included compliance with the Environmental Regulation,
which states that "[m] easures financed by the Funds... shall be in
keeping with the provisions of the Treaties, with the instruments
adopted pursuant thereto and with Community policies, including
those concerning ... environmental protection." 3' 2 6 Additionally,
the Preamble to the regulation provides, "Fund operations must be
consistent with Community policies, inter alia as regards ... environmental protection." 327 The applicants argued that these provisions placed an affirmative obligation upon the Commission to
monitor the environmental compliance of the project and to sus3 28
pend funding if all procedures were not observed.
The Decision was ambiguous as to whether the Commission was
required, or merely permitted, to suspend payment for violation of
those requirements. 3 29 In spite of this ambiguity, the Decision permits a finding that the Commission was required to suspend funding upon the discovery of irregularities, implying an affirmative
monitoring obligation. Even if the Commission were merely
authorized to suspend funding, the Decision's repeated concern
with the eventuality of noncompliance suggests that the Commission, in adopting the Decision, expected that its representative
would monitor the project. The Advocate General argued, moreover, that the principles supporting an individual's ability to enforce
the Community law obligations of national authorities may be
326. Council Regulation 2052/88, supra note 32, art. 7.
327. Id. at 10.
328. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1660.
329. The Court says the Commission "could" cut off funding. GreenpeaceII, 1998 E.C.R.
at 1-1704. This determination is consistent with Article 5 of the decision, which provides,
"[f] ack of compliance with any of the conditions mentioned in this Decision shall authorise
the Commission to reduce or cancel the assistance granted." Id. at 1-1677 n.60 (emphasis
added). Similarly, an annex to the Decision, while placing obligations upon the Member
State, provides that the Commission "may reduce or suspend assistance" if it finds an irregA20, A21 (emphasis added). However, the
ularity in the operation. Id. at Annex III,
Court also cites another annex, which provides, "[i]f the Commission observed that a certain operation has not complied with or is not complying with community policy, it shall
retain payment of community funds for that operation and shall notify this to the authority
C2
responsible in the member State for implementing the operation." Id. at Annex III,
(emphasis added). That paragraph continues,
In the letter of notification, there shall also be determined which measures are to
be taken in regard to community funds disbursed for the operation. There shall
be temporarily suspended those aspects of the operation to which such procedures have been applied, and the current and remaining [installments] shall be
reduced. Therefore, the endowment allocated to the operation in question will
not be taken into account in the advances and future commitments, as long as the
Commission does not have evidence that the adequate corrective measures have
been applied, or that the member State, with approval from the Commission, has
substituted such operation by another appropriate operation.
Id. at Annex III, C2 (emphasis added).
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extended to the ability to enforce the Community law obligations
30
of Community authorities as well.3
The Environmental Directive, also relied upon by the applicants
as a source of their legal interest, ensures the participation of "the
public concerned" in several specific ways. These provisions appear
to contemplate the direct impact that Community projects can
have on European citizens living near enough to be affected by
them and, consequently, endows them with certain guarantees of
participation. First, the Preamble provides,
Whereas development consent for public and private projects
which are likely to have significant effects on the environment
should be granted only after prior assessment of the likely significant
environmental effects of these projects has been carried out; whereas
this assessment must be conducted on the basis of the appropriate information supplied by the developer, which may be supplemented by the authorities and by the people who may be
concerned by the project in question .. . . 31
The Environmental Directive specifies the type of participation
afforded to concerned individuals:
2. Member States shall ensure that:
-any request for development consent and any information gathered pursuant to Article 5 are made available to the public,
-the public concerned is given the opportunity
to express an
33 2
opinion before the project is initiated.
The environmental Directive also provides that, should a Member
State exempt a project from its provisions, "the Member State
shall . .. make available to the public concerned the information
"333 Memrelating to the exemption and the reasons for granting it.
ber States also have the right to "determine the public concerned"
and to establish the terms of public access to information.3 3 4
Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Environmental Directive, found by the
Court of Justice to have direct effect for individuals, endowed a
330. GreenpeaceI, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1677-78 (opinion ofAdvoc. Gen. Cosmas of Sept. 23,
1997). This analogy has significant federalist implications for the position of the Community citizen vis-A-vis the Community institutions. Rather than distinguishing the citizen's
relationship with his national government from the citizen's relationship with the Community, the Advocate General was persuaded to equate the citizen-state relationship with the
citizen-Community relationship because of the effect of the legislation on the citizen and
the need for some corresponding right of enforcement. Id. Such an equation of Community citizenship and national citizenship, if reflective of public opinion, might be a harbinger of an increasingly uncontroversial trend toward the federalization of Europe.
331. Council Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 32, preamble, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
332. Id. art. 6(2).

333.
334.

Id. art. 2(2).
Id. art. 6(3).
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corresponding right of enforcement. 33 5 Article 6 would appear to
be no less specific or direct in its operation and might easily be
viewed as having direct effect as well.
Although the undefined "public concerned" may be too nebulous to demarcate the class of persons who will be individually concerned, the two classes need not be perfectly coextensive. The
assurance of rights to the "public concerned" demonstrates that
the Environmental Directive creates rights for some individuals.
Those rights, however, are merely one aspect of the legal interest
in challenging Greenpeace II. That interest is constituted by the
direct effect of the Environmental Directive in conjunction with
the interest in enforcing the Commission's environmental monitoring obligations. The next step in the Court's individual concern
analysis involves distinguishing between those persons sufficiently
harmed to have a claim upon Community protection in light of the
Environmental Directive and regulation and those not sufficiently
harmed. This "nexus" requirement is the final element defining
the individually-concerned class. While the class of applicants with
the required nexus will be within the "public concerned" of the
Environmental Directive, it need not be coextensive with it.
It is at step two/three of the individual concern analysis that the
Court of Justice must determine whether the particular mix of
attributes presented by the applicants constitutes an adequate
approximation of the class of persons that Community law
intended to protect through the identified legal interests. The
applicants had submitted statements indicating that they stood to
suffer harm because they reside, own property, or work near the
construction projects.3 3 6 They cited potential harms to human
health, ecosystem health, tourism, fishing, farming, education, and
33 7
recreation.
Both the CFI and the Advocate General held that the general
nature of the harms alleged was insufficient to distinguish the
applicants from any other potentially affected persons. To some
degree, urging greater specificity makes sense. In order to draw
reasonable lines, allocating Community responsibility for some
harms while not holding the Community hostage for every claim
down to the most minute of harms, the courts must have as much
information as possible about the actual or expected environmen335.
336.
1997).
337.

Case C-131/88, Commission v. Germany, 1991 E.C.R. 1-825, 1-826.
Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1697 (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Cosmas of Sept. 23,
Id.
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tal impact of the project. As the Advocate General noted, however,
the grievance in this instance was due to the failure to perform the
environmental impact assessment. Under those circumstances,
there would exist no information regarding specific effects that
would impact one person significantly more than the next.3 38 The
courts would then be required to resort to more general criteria such as proximity to the project site or degree of reliance on the
affected activity - to draw the circle around those sufficiently
affected to merit individual concern. In Greenpeace II, then, residence or work on Gran Canarias or Tenerife should be sufficient
to establish individual concern.3 39 Most of the individuals, and by
extension their representative associations,3 40 satisfy these criteria.
B.

EnsuringEffective JudicialProtection

Greenpeace II could have been found admissible when analyzed
like any other individual concern case. Admitting Greenpeace II
would not automatically mean admitting a slew of collective rights
cases. Each new applicant, whether or not the rights alleged were
collective, would have to march through the same steps and satisfy
the courts that he or she was the intended beneficiary of a Community norm threatened by the challenged measure.
Consideration of each standing claim, instead of a bright-line
rule excluding all cases that might be characterized as vindicating
collective rights, will undoubtedly mean more work for the Community courts. The workload increase, however, would be considerably more moderate than feared by the courts and commentators
who assume that admitting one collective rights case means admitting all (or nearly all) of them. Instead of creating a precedent
from which other collective rights cases can hardly be distin338. See id. at 1-1655.
339. Most of the Greenpeace applicants alleged standing based on one or both of these
factors. Greenpeace 1, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-2221-23. A few, who alleged only occasional or recreational use of the area, might not meet this standard. Id. at 11-2223.
340. The standing of representative associations is generally dependent on that of its
members. See generally Case 191/82, Fediol v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, 2939-40,
[1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 244, 251 (1984) (opinion of Advoc. Gen. Rozos of Oct. 4, 1983) (stating
association's ability to express a legally recognizable and protected interest established its
legal person-hood thereby entitling the association to bring an action); Case 72/74, Union
Syndicale v. Council, 1975 E.C.R. 401, 406, 410, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 131,140 (1975) (stating
that trade associations may bring legal action to protect the interests of their members);
Joined Cases 19-22/62, Federation Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en
Gros des Viandes v. Council, 1962 E.C.R. 491, 496-99, [1963] 2 C.M.L.RL 160, 175 (1963)
(stating that an association, in its capacity as a representative of a group of entrepreneurs,
cannot be concerned individually by a measure affecting the general interests of the persons in the group).

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 32

guished, admitting Greenpeace II would merely indicate that the
courts will hear the individual concern claims of such litigants and
will admit them if they, like any other applicant, satisfy certain criteria. Some collective rights cases will be admissible, but many still
will not. Either the courts will find that the Community did not
create any individual legal interest impinged by the challenged act,
or it will find that the applicants at bar are not among those sufficiently affected to fall within that protection.
In any event, any moderate workload increase should be offset
by the beneficial principle of ensuring effective judicial protection
for all legally protected interests of European citizens. The Court
of Justice relied on this principle in numerous cases, most notably
PartiEcologiste 'Les Verts' v. EuropeanParliament,to justify its less conventional rulings of admissibility. 341 In effect, this principle is
probably no less than the existing doctrinal window into the adjudication process described in this paper: While purporting to
extend its case law to afford effective judicial protection, the Court
ofJustice may in fact have been signaling that individual concern is
inextricably linked to the applicant's possession of an interest
endowed upon him or her by Community law. When such an interest exists, the courts must, in keeping with their obligations under
Article 220 (formerly article 164),342 protect that interest. Such a
ruling is less an extension of individual concern jurisprudence
than a legitimization of it.
Most or all of the Greenpeace H applicants possessed a legal interest in environmental integrity ensured by observance of proper
environmental impact assessment procedure, involving input by
concerned persons and monitoring by the Commission. By refusing to grant standing to those applicants, the Court of Justice left
341. Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. at 1365 (explaining that Community is "based on the
rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of
the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the Treaty");
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 274-75, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 335, 35455 (1971) (applying review of Community acts based on principle of respect for rule of law
in interpretation and application of Treaty); see also Vandersanden, supra note 20, at 546;
D. Waelbroeck & A.-M. Verheyden, Les conditions de rece'abilit des recours en annulation des
particulierscontre les actes normatifs communautaires, 1995 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPtEN 43940
(explaining that "the primary function of an administrative order is to permit the maintenance of good administration, but equally to be sure that, in a State based on the rule of
law, illegality remains in itself a wrong") (author's translation).
342. Article 164 provides, "[t] he Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EC TREATY art. 220; see Case 22/70,
Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 335, 357 (1971) (explaining
that the system of appeals established by Art. 173 was intended to ensure, in conformity
with Art. 164, enforcement of rule of law).
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those interests, which spring from Community norms evidenced by
the Treaty34 3 and secondary legislation, 344 without effective judicial
protection. Although actions had been filed in the national courts,
those actions could challenge only the propriety of the construc3 45
tion authorizations, not the propriety of the funding itself.
Although, conceivably, the national courts might have referred the
question of the propriety of the payments to the Court ofJustice by
way of reference to Article 234 (formerly Article 177), however, no
346
such reference was made.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In addition to its dictum in cases like Buralux and the development of the "special category" jurisdiction, the Court has increasingly edged toward open recognition of the paramount
importance of the underlying legal norms in individual concern
34 7
adjudication. In 1999, in Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Commission,
the Court accepted an analogy to the Greek yarn case made by rice
producers in the Netherlands Antilles who objected to the imposition of a minimum price for rice imported into the Community.
The applicants' claims alleged that the Commission had not properly evaluated the market conditions to justify the imposition of
safeguard measures. 34 8 The applicants argued that the purpose of
the decision by the overseas countries and territories to associate,
on which the contested decision was based, was similar in purpose
and effect to the Act of Accession at issue in Piraiki-Patraiki.The
Italian government argued that the Court should apply Buralux
and hold the application inadmissible. The CFI held that the applicants, with goods in transit when the decision was taken, were individually concerned. In affirming that ruling, the Court of Justice
343. See EC TR.A-ry arts. 2, 3(1), 174.
344. Council Regulation 2052/88, supra note 31, and Council Directive 85/337/EEC,
supra note 32.
345. The Court of Justice, in its findings, pointed out that the actions in the national
courts "are based on the same rights afforded to individuals by Directive 85/337," and
reasoned that those rights were therefore fully protected. Greenpeace II, 1998 E.C.R_ at I1716. This reasoning glosses over the difference between the legal interest in protection
from the improper construction authorization by the national authorities and the violation
of their environmental rights ly the Commission in the funding process itself.
346. Article 177 requires courts of last resort (and permits lower courts) to refer to the
Court of Justice any questions requiring interpretation of Community law not already evident from Community case law. EC TR.Ary art. 177.
347. Case C-390/95 P, No. 695JO390, 1999 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1754, at *19 (E.C.J. Feb.
11, 1999)
348. Id. at *19-20.
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stated, "[t]he Court of First Instance was . . . entitled to consider ... that what matters for identifying the persons individually
concerned by a decision introducing a safeguard measure is the
protection enjoyed under Community law by the country or territory, and by the undertakings concerned, against which the safe3 49
guard measure is adopted."
By acknowledging that "what matters" for individual concern are
the rights given to the applicants by the underlying legislation, the
Court took a significant step toward bringing to the fore that which
has always operated submerged in standing jurisprudence. Illumination of this process can have important effects for the case law of
individual concern. As GreenpeaceH!illustrates, arguments for standing to vindicate collective rights may appear to advocate an unprecedented and untoward expansion of the judicial role as long as the
'judging" inherent in the individual concern judgment remains
obscured. As long as admitting one collective rights case is seen as
opening the floodgates of an indistinguishable torrent of cases in
this "new category," an already-overloaded Community judiciary is
likely to shy away. When we recognize that all individual concern
cases turn on the centrality of the underlying legal interests and
depend on the exercise of judicial discretion to make distinctions
in degree between harmed persons, arguments for admissibility of
collective rights cases may be examined on their real merits, linking the standing question to the legal interest involved. The judiciary will then no longer be haunted by constitutional and
prudential hobgoblins summoned by the inaccurate perception of
collective rights cases as some distressingly fecund new breed of
individual concern cases.
GreenpeaceH should have been admitted, because failure to admit
it leaves individuals, severed from legal interests created by norms
established in Community law, without effective judicial protection
of those interests. Moreover, Greenpeace II could have been admitted without bringing the juridical house down. Admitting Greenpeace II would not necessitate allowing a flood of collective rights
cases any more than admitting one economic-rights case necessitates allowing any other. The Court of Justice's individual concern
jurisprudence has always sought to protect individual legal interests
arising from Community law. Whether the interests protected by
Community norms are particularized or collective, the Community

349.

Id. at *20-21
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judiciary need only protect legal interests as it always has - no
more, and no less.
With the way cleared for standing to enforce collective rights,
European public interest law ought to proceed from conception to
reality. As Community legislation expands further into areas of
general public concern, a greater sense of European citizenship
and of European society may be fostered. On that ground, natural
and legal persons who are collectively affected by infringements of
Community-ensured rights in the environment, consumer safety,
and other areas, may come together to challenge those infringements with actions for annulment of Community legislation under
Article 173(4), no longer impeded by the doctrine of individual
concern. Where Community interest in protecting certain collective rights is sufficiently high, that policy will be embodied in Community law, upon which the most severely affected persons may
rely. When, in appropriate cases, the false obstacle of individual
concern is removed, the Community courts may more fully "ensure
that in the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty the law is
350
observed."

350.

EC TF.axry art. 164.

